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I. MEASURING AND SATISFYING THE PAYMENTS INTERESTS OF 
FINANCIAL MARKET PLAYERS 
This is an article about whether the new and complex law governing 
the movement of big money satisfies the interests of the money 
movers. 1 The purpose of wire transfer law should be to satisfy the 
interests of three groups that regularly participate in financial market 
transactions: traders, settlements departments and funds transfer 
systems. 2 Is this purpose met, and how can we gauge whether it is? 
The crux of the analysis is contained in two conceptual steps. First, 
do the "rules of the wire" produce one or more of the following 
microeconomic benefits for one or more ofthe financial market players: 
reduce uncertainty and transactions costs, efficiently allocate risks and 
losses, avoid moral hazard and free rider problems or generate 
economies of scale? Second, do the rules lower credit, market, 
settlement and systemic risks associated with transactions in securities, 
money-market instruments and foreign exchange? If funds transfer law 
I. The two statutes discussed herein are Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C. or Article 4A) and the United Nations Model Law on International Credit Transfers (U.N. 
Model Law). The version of U.C.C. Article 4A cited to herein is the 1989 Official Text with 
Comments approved by the American Law Institute and National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws. U.C.C. art. 4A, 28 U.L.A. 455-549 (1989). The U.N. Model Law is 
published in U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex I, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/47/17 (1992) 
[hereinafter U.N. MODEL LAW]. U.C.C. Article 4A governs the electronic transfer of roughly two 
trillion dollars of bank credit every day. See ERNEST T. PATRIKIS, THOMAS C. BAXTER & RAJ 
BHALA, WIRE TRANSFERS 3, 5-6 (1993). Because Article 4A has been adopted by nearly every 
state, it is unlikely that the U.N. Model Law will be enacted in the United States. Foreign 
countries, however, may well enact all or part of the U.N. Model Law, in which case it would 
govern the transfer of vast sums of funds denominated in foreign currencies. 
2. Of course, these interests should be satisfied without contravening appropriate public 
policy. Indeed, one purpose for Federal Reserve participation in the drafting of the U.C.C. and 
the U.N. Model Law was to ensure that appropriate public policy concerns were considered. 
This is a companion article to Raj Bhala, The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law, 82 KY. 
L.J. 347 (1993-1994). In that article, I lay the theoretical foundation for the current work. The 
Inverted Pyramid addresses the issues of why and to whom wire transfer law is important and 
argues that the answers are found in the interests of financial market players and, ultimately, the 
growth and development of financial markets. This Article takes up where The Inverted Pyramid 
left off by critically analyzing specific provisions in wire transfer law in relation to the interests 
of the players. 
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provides an affirmative answer to both questions, then players in the 
financial markets are more likely to use funds transfers to settle 
payment obligations arising from their deals. In tum, courts will uphold 
their arrangements as consistent with public policy which will alleviate 
uncertainty and transaction enforcement costs. The rules of U.C.C. 
Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law generally, but not always, yield 
these answers; where they do not, statutory reforms are needed. 
The thesis advanced is two-fold. First, microeconomic and banking 
concepts should be the critical analytical tools for measuring how well 
specific provisions of funds transfer law advance the interests of 
financial market players. Most of the insights are derived through a 
small number of straightforward concepts. With respect to micro-
economics,3 there are five key tools: (1) transactions costs,4 (2) 
uncertainty,5 (3) efficient loss allocation,6 (4) moral hazard' and (5) 
3. This Article is not intended to be a full-scale technical exposition of the microeconomics 
of funds transfer law. Professors Cooter and Rubin justify their use of microeconomic analysis 
on the grounds that their topic (loss allocation in consumer payments) "is a technical and largely 
monetary subject .... " Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for 
Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 66 (1987). These are also features of wholesale funds 
transfers and accordingly make microeconomic analysis "an appropriate and promising place to 
start." /d. But, the essence of the argument here is to place funds transfers in the broader context 
of the financial markets. To make the link between financial market activity and the attractiveness 
of funds transfers as a means of payment to financial market players, the application of 
microeconomic tools in an informal, non-mathematical manner suffices. 
4. This is a generic term designed to capture a number of specific costs that arise in 
particular situations, including the costs of negotiating and monitoring a cooperative solution, the 
costs of communication, strategic costs, and the costs of enforcement (which arise because 
ambiguous or inappropriate rules prompt litigation). See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 100-02 (1988). The specific cost envisioned in settling payments obligations 
arising from financial market transactions is the cost of the funds transfer. 
5. The meaning of"uncertainty" intended here is "primary" or "event" uncertainty, which 
"exists because certain future events that are crucial to economic decisions taken today are 
unknown or unknowable." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 55. In contrast, "secondary" or 
"market" uncertainty exists where "information about certain future or present events is known to 
some but not to all economic actors." /d. The latter involves informational asymmetry. If the. 
application of the laws governing funds transfers leads to unpredictable results, or if there is a legal 
void in that no funds transfer laws exist, then all parties are likely to share the same informational 
disadvantage (although in some instances one party may have less of a disadvantage and act 
accordingly). Future events, such as the outcome of an interloper fraud case, are unknown; hence 
there is primary uncertainty. 
6. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 70-86, which discusses the loss spreading, loss 
reduction, and loss imposition principles and the consistency of legal policy· recommendations 
suggested by these principles. For a more theoretical treatment of efficiency, see John L. Hanks, 
On a Just Measure of the Efficiency of Law and Governmental Policies, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. I 
(1986) and David G. Carlson, Reforming the Efficiency Criterion: Comments on Some Recent 
Suggestions, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 39 (1986). 
7. This is "the problem that arises when the behavior of the insuree changes after the 
purchase of insurance so that the probability of loss or the size of the loss increases." COOTER & 
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economies of scale. 8 The four key banking concepts are different types 
of risk analysis: (I) credit risk,9 (2) market risk, 10 (3) settlement 
risk 11 and (4) systemic risk. 12 The extent of the intersection between 
the law and the interests of the players should be gauged using 
fundamental analytical concepts drawn from these two disciplines. 
Second, U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law adequately 
address many, but not all, of these interests. Where a gap exists 
between the law and its purpose, statutory reform is required. 
Technical rules regarding: (I) same-day execution, 13 (2) consequential 
damage liability, 14 (3) receiver finality, 15 (4) discharge, 16 (5) pay-
ment order processing, 17 (6) money-back guarantees, 18 (7) interloper 
fraud 19 and (8) variation by agreement2° should be assessed using 
these microeconomic and banking concepts in order to appraise the link 
between funds transfer law and the growth and development of the 
financial market. Where the technical rules fail to serve the broader 
policy goal of aiding the growth and development of domestic and 
international financial markets, changes to the rules are in order.21 
ULEN, supra note 4, at 65-66. 
8. These occur "when the cost per unit (or average cost) of production declines as the total 
amount of output increases." /d. at 97 n.S. 
9. "Credit risk" is "the risk that a counterparty to a transaction will fail to perform according 
to the terms and conditions of the contract, thus causing the holder of the claim to suffer a loss." 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
CORPORATION, AND OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, DERIVATIVE PRODUCT 
ACTIVITIES OF COMMERCIAL BANKS: JOINT STUDY CONDUCTED IN REsPONSE TO QUESTIONS 
POSED BY SENATOR RIEGLE ON DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS app. Ill at 2-3 (1993) [hereinafter, JOINT 
DERIVATIVES STUDY]. 
I 0. This is "the risk of a change in the price of an asset." /d. app. III at 7. 
II. As "between two counterparties, [this is] the risk that a counterparty to whom a firm has 
made a delivery of assets or money defaults before the amounts due or assets have been received; 
or the risk that technical difficulties interrupt delivery or settlement even if the counterparties are 
able to perform." /d. app. Ill at 9. 
· 12. Systemic risk pertains to the contagion effect and is the financial market analog to the 
domino theory of international politics. It is "the risk that a disruption (at a firm, in a market 
segment, to a settlement system etc.) causes widespread difficulties at other firms, in other market 
segments or in the financial system as a whole." /d. app. III at 10. 
13. See infra part IIJ.A. 
14. See infra part Ill.B. 
15. See infra part IV .A. 
16. See infra part IV.A. 
17. See infra part IV .B. 
18. See infra part JV.B. 
19. See infra part IV.C. 
20. See infra part V.A. 
21. It is generally accepted that many of these technical rules arose as a result of negotiations 
among the drafters. The analysis offered herein does not suggest that political deal-making in the 
drafting process is unimportant or that an economic construct is a complete explanation of the 
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Whether funds transfer law22 adequately addresses the interests of 
those involved in settling these payment obligations is an unexplored 
topic. This lack of exploration is ironic because every day we hear or 
read about trillions of dollars worth of transactions in the markets for 
foreign exchange, 23 short -term instruments, 24 corporate securities, 25 
derivative products26 and interbank lending. 27 What we do not focus 
on is how the payment obligations generated by these transactions are 
settled. We implicitly, but wrongly, assume that the trade of U.S. 
dollars for Japanese yen, the purchase of British Telecom shares by 
Credit Suisse on behalf of a private client on the London Stock 
Exchange and the overnight loan of ten million French francs by 
Banque Nationale de Paris to Citibank is done when the traders at the 
financial institutions agree over the telephone to the terms and 
conditions. There are, in truth, many more activities involved; one of 
process. 
22. The term "funds transfers" is technically more accurate than the term "wire transfers" 
because payment orders may be transmitted not only by wire (electronically), but also orally (by 
·telephone) or in writing (by letter). See U.C.C. § 4A-104 cmt. 6 (1989). It is legally incorrect to 
think of a funds transfer as money moving through a pipeline. A funds transfer is a transfer of 
bank credit from one account to another. /d. § 4A-l 04 cmt. 4. l11e account holder has a non-
possessory personal property interest, or chose in action, in the bank account. See BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 241 (6th ed. 1990). 
23. This is a global, twenty-four hour market for trading national currencies. See generally 
RUDI WEISWEILLER, HOW THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET WORKS (original English language 
ed. 1990). 
24. This is a generic term for the interbank market in several distinct, short-term money 
market instruments such as U.S. Treasury bills (short-term debt issued at a discount and redeemed 
at face value), short-term government agency securities (e.g., discount notes issued by the Federal 
National Mortgage Association), commercial paper (promissory notes issued at a discount and 
redeemed at par value, or paying a fixed interest rate) and repurchase agreements or "repos" (the 
temporary sale of securities subject to an agreement of repurchase where the difference between 
the sale and repurchase prices yields a set interest rate). See FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK, A POCKET GUIDE TO SELECTED SHORT-TERM INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET 
( 1987). 
25. This refers to the equity and debt securities issued by corporations. 
26. "[A] derivative is a financial contract whose value depends on the values of one or more 
underlying assets or indexes of asset values." JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY, supra note 9, at 2. 
Derivative instruments include futures contracts, options and swaps. See id. app. III at 5, 8, I 0. 
27. A principal form of interbank lending is the purchase and sale of Federal funds (Fed 
funds) and repurchase agreements (repos). The Fed funds "market is described as one in which 
commercial banks borrow and lend excess reserve balances held at the Federal Reserve." Charles 
M. Lucas et at., Federal Funds and Repurchase Agreements, FED. REsERVE BANK OF N.Y. Q. 
REV., Summer 1977, at 33, reprinted in part in FINANCIAL MARKETS: INSTRUMENTS AND 
CONCEPTS 9, 9-10 (John R. Brick et at. eds., 2d ed. 1986). Accordingly, there is an overlap 
between the terms "short-term money market instruments" and "interbank borrowing and lending" 
in that Fed funds and repos are short-term instruments and the subject of interbank lending. Note 
also that borrowing Fed funds is referred to as a "purchase" of Fed funds while lending is referred 
to as a "sale." 
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these is the settlement of the payment obligations. How are the U.S. 
dollars sent to their purchaser? How does Credit Suisse pay for the 
stock? How does Banque Nationale de Paris get the francs to Citibank? 
The answer to each of these questions is very likely the same: wire 
transfer. The hidden fact is that many, if not most, payment obligations 
are settled by wire transfer. 
The remainder of this Article is organized into five parts. Part II 
establishes a hypothetical international financial transaction and 
identifies the key players and their interests. This hypothetical is 
referred to in the subsequent parts. Part III focuses on the interests that 
traders in financial markets have with respect to a funds transfer statute. 
Similarly, Part IV studies the interests of settlements departments of 
financial institutions and Part V examines the interests of funds transfer 
systems in which the financial institutions participate. The emphasis in 
Parts III-V is on the critique of U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model 
Law in light of these interests, using analytical tools drawn from 
microeconomics and banking. Conclusions are set forth in Part VI. 
II. FINANCIAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS AND INTEREST GROUPS 
A. The Interest Groups 
Who are the movers of big money? Financial institutions, namely 
commercial banks like Citibank and securities firms such as Merrill 
Lynch, are the most prominent participants in domestic and international 
financial markets. 28 The conventional approach to analyzing the 
markets is to view these institutions as a whole and consider them as 
monoliths. Unfortunately, this approach obscures the rich diversity of 
groups within each institution, as well as the diversity of their interests. 
The approach also fails to account for private groups and networks 
28. See generally A Survey of the International Capital Markets, ECONOMIST, July 21-27, 
1990, at I. Large corporations such as IBM also participate in the markets, typically to hedge 
against currency or interest rate risk exposures on their balance sheets. See, e.g., Eugene E. 
Comiskey and Charles W. Mulford, Risks of Foreign Currency Transactions: A Guide for Loan 
Officers, S COM. LENDING REV. 44, 44-45 (1990). Wealthy, sophisticated individual investors are 
also participants. See, e.g., Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993) (involving 
a doctor trading over-the-counter foreign exchange option contracts). Central banks such as the 
Federal Reserve participate intermittently in some markets to implement domestic monetary or 
international exchange rate policies. See, e.g., Review of Treasury Department's Conduct of 
International Financial Policy: Hearing Before the House Commillee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, JOist Cong., 2d Sess. 4-22, 60-74 (Aug. 14, 1990) (statement of David C. Mulford, 
Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs); FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK, FEDPOINTS 44: FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION (1988). The most prominent 
participants are, however, commercial banks and securities firms. 
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formed by several institutions acting collectively. It is not enough to 
ask about Citibank's or Merrill Lynch's interests with respect to a funds 
transfer statute. Rather, these institutions must be intellectually 
dissected and specific groups must be isolated. 
1. Traders 
This close inspection of financial institutions results in the identifica-
tion of two distinct interest groups: traders and settlements depart-
ments. Financial institutions employ large numbers of traders to buy 
and sell foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments, 
corporate securities and derivative products. 29 The world of the trader 
is one of advanced information technology in which she electronically 
communicates instantaneously with her trading counterparties around 
the world by electronic devices. In seconds the trader buys and sells 
millions of dollars worth of Thai baht, General Motors commercial 
paper, Singapore Airlines stock or put options on British pounds.30 
This is a world in which geographical borders mean nothing; informa-
tion technology and financial market deregulation allow a trader to 
make transactions anytime, anyplace.31 
The trader wants to be able to move rapidly to take advantage of 
profitable trading opportunities, and to do so cheaply so that the very 
costs of transacting do not devour a sizeable chunk of her profits. 
Paying or receiving payment for foreign exchange or financial instru-
ments bought or sold by means of paper-based instruments like checks 
is slow and cumbersome. Moreover, a paper-based system has 
opportunity costs: Expected payments that are held up in the check 
collection process would be unavailable for use in new financial deals. 
It is not surprising, then, that the trader prefers to settle payments 
obligations arising from her transactions in the markets mentioned 
above by means of a funds transfer. A funds transfer system has the 
benefits of low cost and high speed. The trader's preference for funds 
transfer settlement is apparent in that foreign exchange obligations are 
settled by funds transfer.32 A less well known example of the trader's 
29. Interbank lending operations, which involve settlement by funds transfer (see supra note 
27), may be conducted out of the institution's treasury function. For present purposes, the 
distinction between the trading and treasury departments is immaterial. 
30. In practice, there is a division of labor on the trading floor of financial institutions. 
Traders tend to specialize in one market, such as Far East equities, rather than several distinct 
markets. 
31. See generally RICHARD O'BRIEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: THE END OF 
GEOGRAPHY 1-6 (1992) (discussing the end of geography as a relevant factor in financial 
transactions). 
32. See J. 0RLIN GRABBE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 75 (2d ed. 1991); see also 
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preference is that payments associated with derivative products, 
specifically options and futures, are made by funds transfers. 33 
Payments obligations arising from purchases of some stocks, bonds and 
government agency issues are settled by funds transfers. 34 In fact, 
funds transfers are an increasingly common method for settling 
corporate stock and bond transactions. 35 In the short-term money 
markets, funds transfers also are used to settle payments obligations 
arising from purchases and sales of Fed funds and repos.36 Payments 
obligations associated with commercial paper also are settled by 
Fedwire funds transfers.37 The trader's preference for funds transfer 
as a means of payment is based on the inherent celerity and cost of this 
device. Consequently, the trader wants a funds transfer law that 
promotes both high speed and low cost funds transfers to settle 
payments obligations arising from her purchases and sales in these 
important financial markets. 
ROGER M. KUBARYCH, FEDERAL REsERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (rev. ed. 1983). 
33. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. GAO/GGD-90-33, CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT 
REFORM: THE STOCK, OPTIONS, AND FUTURES MARKETS ARE STILL AT RISK 40 (1990) 
(hereinafter 1990 GAO REPORT]. 
34. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL REsERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL REsERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 109 (7th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS]. 
35. See the discussion of the same-day funds settlement proposal of the National Securities 
Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Depository Trust Company (DTC) contained in 
MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY AND NATIONAL SECURITIES CLEARING 
CORPORATION TO USERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES RE: A SAME-DAY FUNDS SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
PROPOSAL FOR INDUSTRY EVALUATION S (June I, 1992) (hereinafter SDFS PROPOSAL]. 
Essentially, the current DTC-NSCC system for settling transactions in common stocks, preferred 
stocks, corporate and municipal bonds, unit investment trusts and warrants is a next-day funds 
settlement system. An NSCC member or DTC participant that owes money to NSCC or DTC as 
a result of a securities transaction pays by certified check. If NSCC or DTC owes money, 
payment is made by draft. The certified checks and drafts clear in one day. /d. at S-6. However, 
NSCC and DTC propose to switch to a same-day funds settlement system whereby all payments 
to or from members and participants arising from securities transactions would be made by 
Fedwire funds transfers. /d. at I, S-6. This would be a "same-day funds settlement system," 
which currently is offered by NSCC and DTC only for commercial paper trades. /d. at 5. 
36. PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS, supra note 34, at 109. Indeed, it has been suggested that the 
Fed funds and repo markets should be called "the markets for short-term immediately available 
funds" because both markets are settled in "immediately available funds" (a term referring to funds 
transfers through Fedwire). Lucas, supra note 27, at 10. 
37. DAVID M. WEISS, AFTER THE TRADE IS MADE: PROCESSING SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS 
. 214, 386-87 ( 1986). See also supra note 35 for the discussion of the same-day funds settlement 
proposal of the National Securities Clearing Corporation and the Depository Trust Company. 
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2. Settlements Departments 
When the trader has agreed with her counterparty to buy or sell 
foreign currency or a financial instrument-such agreement typically is 
made over the telephone--she will issue payment instructions (orally or 
in writing) to her colleagues in the settlements department. The 
settlements clerks, employed by the same financial institution as the 
trader, are charged with the responsibility of processing large volumes 
of payment orders in a short period of time. The orders reflect 
completed transactions entered into by all of the institution's traders. 
Accordingly, certainty in the sense of routine algorithms for handling 
the orders is critical. If the settlements department had to examine each 
order by hand for potential inconsistencies or fraud, then payments 
could not be made quickly. Similarly, knowing when final payment is 
made, (that is, when a credit received is irrevocable) and when 
discharge occurs (that is, when an underlying contractual obligation 
arising from a trade is discharged) adds certainty to the movement of 
money. There is, then, a synergistic relationship between the trader and 
the institution's settlements department with respect to moving big 
money: The trader wants to make or receive payments rapidly, which 
is made possible in part by standardized methods for processing 
payment orders. 
The settlements department is commonly referred to as the back 
office.38 This is a misleading label, however, because it conjures up 
notions of mounds of paper piled up on desks of bureaucratically-
minded employees. In fact, the back office is a critical link in a funds 
transfer chain because of the systemic importance of its operations. The 
October 1987 stock market crash demonstrates the systemic risk 
problem associated with the failure of one or a few trading institutions 
and the relevance of funds transfers.39 When the crash occurred, many 
38. See KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 35-36 (discussing mechanics of foreign exchange 
settlement). 
39. Since the October 19, 1987 stock market crash, these systems have been the subject of 
increasing attention from financial market regulators. As the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) stated: 
Properly operating clearance and settlement systems are important to the efficiency and 
integrity of financial markets. Their failure to continue to operate in volatile markets 
can further exacerbate market instability. The inability of a major clearing member to 
meet major obligations could jeopardize the financial health of all the clearing organiza-
tions to which it belongs, because the trade guarantee makes the clearing organization 
responsible for fulfilling the financial obligations of its failed clearing members. 
1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 15. See also BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERBANK NETTING SCHEMES OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE 
GROUP OF TEN COUNTRIES (1990) [hereinafter LAMFALUSSY REPORT, after the Chairman of the 
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commercial and investment banks that were obligated to pay for 
securities were unable to fulfill this obligation, or were late in doing so. 
Among the reasons for the delayed payments was that "[t]he federal 
wire transfer system essential for fund transfers did not work on several 
occasions."40 In other words, problems in making funds transfers 
caused delays in discharging payments obligations. Creditors were, 
therefore, at risk during the period of delay. To the extent that they 
relied on timely payment from their debtors to fund their own payments 
obligations, creditors risked defaulting on these obligations. From the 
back office's perspective, to avoid such systemic risk, funds transfer law 
should promote standardized, automated means for processing payment 
orders and resolving problems. It should satisfy the concerns regarding 
the authentication of payment instructions and allocation of the risk of 
interloper fraud. Rules on receiver finality and discharge are necessary. 
These interests are particularly acute during periods of stress caused by 
turmoil in financial markets.41 
3. Funds Transfer Systems 
A third important interest group in the financial markets is evident 
not from dissecting a particular financial institution, but from observing 
the private arrangements that several such institutions make in connec-
tion with funds transfers. The two most prominent U.S. systems, the 
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) and the Federal 
Reserve's wire transfer network (Fedwire), are used by financial 
institutions around the world to make funds transfers denominated in 
U.S. dollars.42 A "funds transfer system" is "a wire transfer network 
. . . or other communication system of a clearing house or other 
association of banks through which a payment order by a bank may be 
transmitted to the bank to which the order is addressed." 43 
Committee, M.A. Lamfalussy ]. 
40. 1990 GAO REPORT, supra note 33, at 42. 
41. To be sure, these considerations are relevant to back offices utilizing other modes of 
payment such as checks and credit cards. However, those modes are inherently more cumbersome 
than funds transfers and, therefore, less able to meet the needs of financial market players. 
42. See generally PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at xxvi, 10-11, 17-19, 140, 
192-93. Fedwire is owned and operated by the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. /d. at xxvi. Any 
"depository institution," as defined in the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 
132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)), is entitled to use Fedwire. /d. at 
II; see 12 U.S.C. § 248(o) (1988). One hundred and twenty-two financial institutions are 
participants in the privately organized and operated CHIPS. PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra 
note I, at 194. 
43. U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5). The U.N. Model Law does not define this term and, in fact, uses 
it only once. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 6(b)(iv). 
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Reducing systemic risk during periods of market stress such as the 
October 1987 crash is important to such systems. The failure of one 
system participant to settle its debts with other participants can cause 
liquidity problems for these others or, worse, the participant's own 
failure. The interests of the back office and the systems are consistent: 
The systems require certainty in payment order processing which, in 
tum, assures that failures to pay will not be caused by bottlenecks in the 
back office. In terms of the law, funds transfer systems are interested 
in systemic risk reduction methods, such as netting payments obliga-
tions, that are enforceable and binding. 
B. A Hypothetical Spot Foreign Exchange Trade and Related For-
eign Stock Purchase Transactionu 
Consider a hypothetical spot dollar-yen transaction in which on day 
one a trader at the Bank of Tokyo sells 120 million yen to a trader at 
Chemical Bank in exchange for $1 million. The payments obliga-
tions-the delivery of 120 million yen to Chemical Bank and of $1 
million to the Bank of Tokyo--must settle on day three because of the 
two business day settlement convention in the spot foreign exchange 
markets.45 As soon as the deal is completed, the settlements depart-
ments ofthe Bank of Tokyo and Chemical Bank are notified of the deal 
by the respective traders. 46 In tum, these back offices exchange 
information relating to the settlement of the payment obligations such 
as bank account numbers held at correspondent banks.47 Assume that 
44. A spot foreign exchange contract involves a commitment by one trader to deliver a 
specific quantity of one currency against another trader's commitment to deliver a specific quantity 
of a second currency. See WEJSWEJLLER, supra note 23, at 18-19. The deliveries typically occur 
within two business days of the contract date. /d. at 19. Of course, the traders enter into such 
contracts on behalf of the financial institutions that employ them. It is, therefore, technically 
correct to speak of the contracting parties as the trading commercial banks or securities firms, not 
the traders. 
A foreign stock purchase simply entails buying shares issued and traded on a non-U.S. stock 
exchange. The share price is denominated in the currency of the country in which the exchange 
is located and must be paid for in that foreign currency. /d. at S-6. Thus, the U.S. purchaser must 
ultimately obtain that currency by converting U.S. dollars. /d. The two hypothetical transactions 
established below are linked in that the foreign currency obtained in the spot deal is used to 
purchase foreign shares. 
45. That is, deliveries are made two days after the trade date, here day one. GRABBE, supra 
note 32, at 75. 
46. KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 35. 
47. In a correspondent banking arrangement, which is commonly used to facilitate 
international banking transactions, one bank provides payment and other services to another bank. 
"Payments through correspondents are often executed through reciprocal accounts (so-called nostro 
and vostro accounts), to which standing credit lines may be attached." COMMITIEE OF 
GoVERNORS OF THE CENTRAL BANKS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
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the Bank ofTokyo will pay the $1 million by means of a funds transfer 
through either CHIPS or Fedwire and Chemical Bank will pay the 120 
million yen by means of a Japanese funds transfer system, the Bank of 
Japan Financial Network System (commonly called "BOJ Net"). 48 
The Bank of Tokyo trader is likely to deliver the 120 million yen to 
Chemical Bank before Chemical Bank pays the $1 million. The reason 
for this order of payment is that the funds transfer business dal9 
opens in Tokyo before opening in New York, due to the time zone 
difference between the two cities.50 Assume that the Bank of Tokyo 
maintains a correspondent account at First Chicago and the $1 million 
are to be credited to that account. Suppose the Bank of Tokyo intends 
to use the $1 million to purchase shares in an initial public offering 
(IPO) of Singapore Telecom (ST) on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 51 
The share price is denominated in Singapore dollars, and the Bank of 
Tokyo purchases the shares through its Singapore broker, Smith New 
Court (SNC). SNC executes the Bank of Tokyo's buy order using its 
COMMUNITY, PAYMENT SYSTEMS IN EC MEMBER STATES 323 (1992). A nostro account is an 
account maintained by one bank at a second bank in another country in the local currency of that 
country. This is a vostro account from the second bank's perspective. See KUBARYCH, supra note 
32, at 38-39. 
48. For an overview of BOJ Net, see BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
IN ELEVEN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 135 (3d ed. 1989). 
49. This is "the part of a day during which the receiving bank is open for the receipt, 
processing, and transmittal of payment orders and cancellations and amendments of payment 
orders." U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(4). A receiving bank is the "bank to which the sender's instruction 
is addressed." /d. § 4A-103(a)(4). A sender is "the person giving the instruction to the receiving 
bank." /d. § 4A-103(a)(5). For a payment instruction to qualify as a payment order under Article 
4A, certain technical requirements (none of which are in issue here) must be met. /d. § 4A-
103(a)(l). 
50. The same problem arises even if the Bank of Tokyo was paying dollars instead of yen 
to Chemical Bank (i.e., if the Bank of Tokyo had bought yen and sold dollars, the converse of the 
hypothetical transaction). Dollar transactions in Japan are settled through the Tokyo dollar clearing 
system sponsored by the Tokyo branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase Tokyo). BANK FOR 
INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 48, at 134. Under that system, the Bank ofTokyo and Chemical 
Bank would each maintain a bank account at Chase Tokyo. Two steps are required. First, Chase 
Tokyo would debit the Bank of Tokyo's account in the amount of$1 million and credit Chemical 
Bank's account in that amount. /d. Second, assuming that the net debit balance of the Bank of 
Tokyo at the end of the business day was $1 million, this balance would be transferred by Chase 
Tokyo to its home office, the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York (Chase New York). Then, the 
Bank of Tokyo would settle its $1 million obligation to Chase New York by means of a funds 
transfer through CHIPS, which is located in New York. /d. The reason for the second step is that 
actual settlement of dollars must ultimately occur in the United States. Chase Tokyo effectively 
extends a $1 million overdraft to the Bank of Tokyo which is not covered until CHIPS is open for 
business in New York. See id. 
51. For present purpqses, it does not matter whether this purchase is on a principal basis (i.e., 
for the Bank of Tokyo's own account) or on an agency basis (i.e., on behalf of a customer). 
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own funds and later obtains reimbursement from the Bank of Tokyo. s2 
Any delay in settling the $1 million payment obligation arising from 
the dollar-yen spot deal has a contagion effect in that it will cause 
problems in the ST stock purchase transaction. Receipt of a $1 million 
credit by day three is essential if the Bank of Tokyo is to make 
payment to SNC for the ST shares in a timely fashion. High speed is 
important to SNC because it seeks to minimize its risk exposure by 
matching delivery of ST shares against payment of U.S. dollars.s3 
Specifically, until the Bank of Tokyo pays SNC the $1 million, SNC 
faces credit, market and currency riskss4 because it has paid out 
Singapore dollars for the ST shares and holds these on its books for the 
account of the Bank of Tokyo. SNC's interest is to avoid the scenario 
in which it has paid out Singapore dollars from its own account and 
received delivery of the ST shares, but has not yet received settlement 
in U.S. dollars from the Bank of Tokyo. The longer the sEan of time 
between these two events, the greater the risks SNC faces. s There is 
a credit risk that the Bank of Tokyo might default on its obligation to 
pay for the ST shares because, for instance, the Bank of Tokyo has not 
received the $1 million to fund the stock purchase. In that event, SNC 
would have to find an alternative purchaser for the ST shares. By that 
time, however, the ST share price may have fallen-a market risk-and 
consequently there may be nobody willing to buy the ST shares at.the 
IPO price that SNC initially paid. There is a currency risk that the 
Singapore dollar will appreciate relative to the U.S. dollar between the 
time that SNC purchases the shares as agent for the Bank of Tokyo and 
the time SNC converts the $1 million reimbursement from the Bank of 
Tokyo to Singapore dollars. The appreciation of the Singapore dollar 
would reduce or eliminate the effective broker's commission SNC 
receives from the Bank of Tokyo. All ofthese risks are mitigated if the 
Bank of Tokyo pays SNC promptly. The Bank of Tokyo's ability to 
pay promptly in tum hinges on the Bank of Tokyo's timely receipt of 
$1 million in its correspondent account at First Chicago. 
52. It may rightly be queried whether the Bank of Tokyo's foreign exchange and equity 
operations are related in the manner implied by this transaction. The critical point, however, is 
that one international financial deal is often linked to a subsequent deal which, in turn, partly 
explains the popular conception that different markets are linked. 
53. Telephone Interview with Warren Yeh, Vice President, Smith New Court, New York 
(June 16, I 993). A delivery-versus-payment system would eliminate the risks because the two 
events occur simultaneously. It does not exist, however, for Far East equities because there is no 
central clearinghouse to clear and settle trades whose members are dealing institutions, like the 
Bank of Tokyo, and brokers, like SNC. /d. 
54. See JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY, supra note 9, at 2-3, 7. 
55. See KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 23. 
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Ill. TRADERS 
A. High Speed and a Same-Day Execution Law 
Because there is a two-day gap between the trade and value date in 
any SfOt foreign exchange deaJ, S6 and an even greater gap in a forward 
deal, s a trader assumes the credit risk of its counterparty during the 
gap. Ideally, a trader who on day one sells 120 million yen in 
exchange for $1 million would like to obtain the $1 million on day one, 
and not wait two days for settlement. If settlement occurred on day 
one, the risk of the counterparty failing or incurring serious liquidity 
problems on days two or three would be irrelevant. The facts in 
Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.s8 illustrate the 
problem that every foreign exchange trader faces. Delbrueck's 
settlement obligations on its three foreign exchange contracts with the 
Gennan banking partnership Bankhaus J.D. Herstatt, K.G.a.A. were 
settled through CHIPS, but Herstatt failed before Delbrueck obtained 
settlement from Herstatt. s9 
Time zones present an obstacle to immediate and simultaneous 
delivery-versus-payment. This obstacle increases the importance of 
high speed in settling payments obligations, particularly in situations in 
which financial transactions are linked as in the above hypothetical. 
Funds transfer law can encourage high speed transfers and minimize 
gaps between linked settlements like the yen-U.S. dollar and U.S. 
dollar-Singapore dollar obligations. For example, the same day 
execution rule of U.C.C. Article 4A ensures that settlement will occur 
on day three and not at a later date:60 Each receiving bank, other than 
a beneficiary's bank,61 must execute62 an accepted63 payment order 
on the day of receipt.64 
56. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
51. A forward foreign exchange contract is identical to a spot contract except that the date 
set for delivery of the underlying currencies is more than two days (generally between one week 
and two years) from the date of the contract. See GRABBE, supra note 32, at 76. 
58. 609 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1979). 
59. /d. at 1049-50. 
60. U.C.C. § 4A-301(a). 
61. The "beneficiary's bank" is "the bank identified in a payment order in which an account 
of the beneficiary is to be credited purs11ant to the order .... " /d.§ 4A-103(a)(3). The term is 
included within the more generic term "receiving bank." See supra note 49 and accompanying 
text. The "beneficiary" is "the person to be paid by the beneficiary's bank." /d. § 4A-103(a)(2). 
62. A receiving bank "executes" a payment order by issuing a payment order "intended to 
carry out the payment order received by the bank." /d. § 4A-301(a). 
63. "[A] receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order when it 
executes the order." /d. § 4A-209(a). 
64. /d. § 4A-301(a); see also id. § 4A-301(a) cmt. 2. This assumes that each receiving bank 
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Article 4A is not wholly satisfactory, however, because of a little-
noticed rule that allows for a delay in payment by a beneficiary's bank 
to the beneficiary. A beneficiary's bank may delay its acceptance 65 of 
a payment order until the opening of the funds-transfer business day 
following the payment date.66 There is no obligation to pay the 
beneficiary until the order has been accepted. 67 During the period of 
delay, the beneficiary's bank can evaluate the credit-worthiness of its 
sender while the payment order is in suspended animation. 68 The 
purpose of the rule's flexibility is to allow the beneficiary's bank to 
minimize the credit risk of its sender. This flexibility comes at the 
expense of the beneficiary's interest in rapid payment. Although the 
beneficiary's bank does not want to accept a payment order and pay the 
beneficiary until the bank receives settlement from its sender, if the 
bank delays acceptance it necessarily delays payment to the beneficiary. 
A beneficiary's bank, like First Chicago69 in the hypothetical, cannot 
prevent or delay acceptance because payment is through Fedwire, 70 but 
receives the payment order before its cut-off hour and that no payment order specifies a later 
execution date. /d. § 4A-106(a) (relating to the time a payment order is received); id. § 4A-301(b) 
(relating to the execution date). 
65. Unlike other receiving banks, a beneficiary's bank does not accept a payment order by 
executing it. /d. § 4A-30 I (a). Rather, it can accept in one of four ways: (I) paying the 
beneficiary, (2) notifying the beneficiary of receipt of a payment order on behalf of the 
beneficiary, (3) receiving payment for the entire amount of the order sent by the sender or (4) the 
manner described in the following text. /d.§ 4A-209(b). See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying 
text for the fourth way a beneficiary's bank can accept a payment order. 
66. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3). This is a form of deemed acceptance akin to that in U.N. Model 
Law Article 9(1)(h) and (2) because the beneficiary's bank is determined to have accepted the 
order by virtue of its failure to reject it within one hour after the opening of the funds-transfer 
business day following the payment date. U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3). A "funds-transfer business day" 
is a day the receiving bank is open for receiving, processing, transmitting, canceling and amending 
payment orders. /d.§ 4A-105(a)(4). The "payment date" is "the day on which the amount of the 
order is payable to the beneficiary by the beneficiary's bank" and, unless otherwise stated in the 
payment order, is "the day the order is received by the beneficiary's bank." /d. § 4A-40l. The 
payment date in the hypothetical is day three. 
67. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a). 
68. PATRJKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at 62. · 
69. In the hypothetical $1 million funds transfer introduced in Part II.B., supra, the following 
U.C.C. Article 4A labels attach to the parties: Chemical Bank is the originator and, possibly, the 
originator's bank (see U.C.C. § 4A-104(d)(ii)); First Chicago is the beneficiary's bank; and Bank 
of Tokyo is the beneficiary. Any bank standing between Chemical Bank and First Chicago-for 
example, a Federal Reserve Bank if Fedwire is used, or a CHIPS correspondent if CHIPS is 
used-would be an "intermediary bank." See U.C.C. § 4A-104(b). 
70. U.C.C. § 4A-209 cmt. 8 (stating that "[i]n the case of a payment made by Fedwire 
acceptance cannot be prevented"). Acceptance by a receiving bank of an order from a Federal 
Reserve Bank occurs upon the receipt of the entire amount of the sender's order. /d. § 4A-
209(b)(2). 
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can if the intermediary bank is a Federal Reserve Bank. 71 In that case, 
First Chicago could delay acceptance until day four and the Bank of 
Tokyo would be paid on that day. The Bank of Tokyo's payment to 
SNC could therefore be delayed by one day. To adequately remedy the 
problem, U.C.C. Article 4A could be amended to remove the possibility 
of delayed acceptance. Another possible remedy is to further limit the 
allowed delay period. For example, limiting the period to a few hours, 
assuming this is practicable, might be theoretically consistent with the 
development of an intra·day funds market. An intra-day funds market 
is suggested by recent regulatory developments in the pricing of 
daylight overdrafts. 72 Pricing an overdraft of a bank account that lasts 
for a few hours and then is covered by a deposit of new funds means 
that money has value for periods less than twenty-four hours. One full 
·day is traditionally the shortest period for calculating interest. 73 
Similarly, limiting the period of delayed acceptance to a few hours 
suggests that the funds being Wired have value to the beneficiary on an 
hour-by-hour (or minute·by-minute) basis. 
From the perspective of the Bank of Tokyo trader the U.N. Model 
Law scheme is even less satisfactory than that of the U.C.C. because 
delay can occur at any or all points in the funds-transfer chain, not just 
at the beneficiary's bank stage. A delay may occur at any point 
because of the problem of passing value in the correct amount to the 
next party in the funds-transfer chain. On this point the U.N. Model 
Law is in need of reform. 74 At the heart of the problem is the 
"execution period" concept that allows a receiving bank "one or two 
days" to execute a payment order. 75 Although a receiving bank is in 
principle obligated to execute a payment order on the day of receipt, the 
bank can execute the order on the following day "for value as of the 
day of receipt. " 76 This is a practical statutory accommodation to 
71. This would occur if CHIPS were used, as it commonly is in the settlement of foreign 
exchange transactions. Thus, the delay induced by a section 4A-209(b)(3) acceptance would 
persist beyond the CHIPS settlement on day three. 
72. See Policy Statement, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,084 (Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 
1992); Policy Statement, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,093 (Board ofGovemors of Fed. Reserve 1992). For 
a discussion of these developments, see PATRJKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at 162-67. 
It would be harmful to allow a provisional credit, however, because this would undennine the 
finality rule of U.C.C. § 4A-405(c). 
73. See PATRIKIS, BAXTER & BHALA, supra note I, at 46 n.29. 
74. An interesting issue arises if the U.N. Model Law is adopted by certain states without 
necessary changes. Arguably, traders will avoid using funds-transfer systems subject to the U.N. 
Model Law because when competition exists between legal regimes, there may be a reverse 
Gresham's Law effect. The good legal regime may drive out the bad one because transactors 
prefer the beneficial effects (e.g., certainty and predictability) of the good regime. 
75. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 2(k). 
76. !d. art. II (2). 
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banks in countries that cannot process payment orders rapidly. Passing 
along value as of the day of receipt raises serious practical concerns, 
however, not the least of which is the calculation of value as of the day 
of receipt. Presumably an interest rate77 will be applied to the princi-
pal value of the payment order for the one-day delay. 
The cumulative delay wrought by the U.N. Model Law scheme is 
evident if the facts of the hypothetical are expanded. Assume that 
Chemical Bank issues a payment order on day three for $1 million to 
Chase New York, which executes 78 the order by issuing a conforming 
order to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed). 79 
The New York Fed executes Chase's order by sending an implementing 
order to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (Chicago Fed), 80 which 
then executes the New York Fed's order by issuing an order to First 
Chicago in favor of the Bank of Tokyo. Assume further that each 
receiving bank executes the payment order it receives on the day after 
receipt for value as of the day received. Chase New York could 
execute on day four for value as of day three, the New York Fed could 
execute on day five for value as of day four, and the Chicago Fed could 
execute on day six for value as of day five. 
If the beneficiary's bank (First Chicago) accepts the order on day six, 
then Bank of Tokyo has experienced a three day delay in receiving $1 
million. Similarly, reimbursement of SNC is delayed and its currency 
risk exposure is extended. While the delayed credit to the Bank of 
Tokyo's account at First Chicago might include interest compensation 
for three days, whether ·the credit must include interest is unclear 
because the U.N. Model Law does not specify the liability of a 
beneficiary's bank to its customer for delayed payment. The matter is 
left to the law governing the relationship between the beneficiary's bank 
and the beneficiary.81 Even if interest is paid, the opportunity cost of 
the delay may exceed the interest rate. For example, Bank of Tokyo 
might have dedicated the $1 million to a highly profitable investment 
in a financial instrument on day three, but by day four adverse price 
movements may have eliminated the opportunity.82 Furthermore, the 
77. "Interest" is loosely defined as the interbank rate. /d. art. 2(m). 
78. /d. art. 2(1) (definition of "execution"). 
79. Chase New York and the New York Fed are intermediary banks, i.e., receiving banks 
other than the originator's or beneficiary's banks. U.C.C. § 4A-104(b). 
80. Assuming Fedwire is used, this is an interdistrict funds transfer. 12 C.F .R. § 21 0.26(f) 
(1993). 
81. U.N. MODEL LAW art 10(1). 
82. Investments in foreign exchange, equities and fixed income securities are examples of 
such opportunities in which prices are volatile. See generally A Survey of International Banking, 
ECONOMIST, Apr. 10-16, 1993, at 5-14 [hereinafter International Banking Survey] (discussing 
volatility in foreign exchange markets, the measurement of potential price changes and various risk 
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actual cost of delay may exceed any compensation. SNC is jeopardized 
by volatility in the foreign exchange, where dramatic price fluctuations 
occur in seconds. 83 If the Singapore dollar appreciates relative to the 
U.S. dollar during the one-day delay, SNC will experience a loss when 
it converts the reimbursement from the Bank of Tokyo; the "as of' 
transfer may not make SNC whole. A more rigorous same-day 
execution rule that is simple to administer might well address these 
concerns by eliminating the three-day delay and the necessity for 
interest compensation. · 
Funds-transfer law is not the only solution to the aforementioned 
risks posed by time gaps. In the hypothetical, two ways exist to 
minimize the gap between the yen and dollar settlements: Private 
contract arrangements and funds-transfer system rules. Under a private 
contract arrangement, the Bank of Tokyo can pay yen into an escrow 
account and instruct the escrow agent to pay Chemical Bank only when 
the agent has received $1 million from Chemical Bank. 84 If the 
dollars are not received by the end of day three, then the yen will be 
returned. However, this solution involves significant transactions costs. 
For each counterparty with which the Bank of Tokyo deals but decides 
is not suitably creditworthy to waive an escrow arrangement, the Bank 
must negotiate such an arrangement and pay at least a portion of the 
escrow fee. 
The alternative way to minimize the time gap problem is to amend 
the rules of the funds-transfer systems used to deliver the dollars and 
yen by extending the hours of operation of each system so that it 
overlaps with the other. Recently, the Federal Reserve proposed to 
extend the hours of operation ofFedwire to overlap with the trading day 
in Tokyo. 85 More generally, the extended hours "could facilitate 
efforts to control temporal risk associated with the settlement of cross-
border and multi-currency transactions, such as foreign exchange 
transactions"86 and "reduc[e] payment system risk in the settlement of 
foreign currency and other types of international transactions."87 
management methods). 
83. See generally id. 
84. The arrangement could involve one escrow agent used by both parties (e.g., a London 
agent, whose funds-transfer business day overlaps with that of New York and Tokyo), or two 
agents (one for Chemical Bank in Japan to receive yen and one for the Bank of Tokyo in the U.S. 
to receive dollars). 
85. 57 Fed. Reg. 47,080-83 (proposed Oct. 14, 1992). The proposal called for the Fedwire 
to open two hours earlier, at 6:30a.m. Eastern Time (ET) instead of the current 8:30a.m. opening 
time. 
86. 57 Fed. Reg. 47,082 (proposed Oct. 14, 1992). 
87. Notice of Extension ofComment, 57 Fed. Reg. 61,906,61,907 (Dec. 29, 1992). 
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Although the Federal Reserve asked for comment on round-the-clock 
operation of F edwire, neither it nor any other central bank appears 
ready to implement a funds transfer system that never closes. Indeed, 
the Federal Reserve has delayed implementing the earlier opening time 
proposal "pending further analysis of the complex issues raised by 
commenters."88 Yet, an extension of Fedwire hours may be just what 
is needed. A funds transfer system that operates on a twenty-four hour 
basis can reduce the credit risks associated with twenty-four hour 
trading by minimizing gaps between delivery and payment. Although 
the Federal Reserve seems to "especially" appreciate "the role of 
Fedwire in enhancing clearance and settlement practices in financial 
markets,"89 it has not assumed a leadership role to ensure that twenty-
four hour global trading is not constrained because ofFedwire's limited 
operating hours. 
A related solution in which the Federal Reserve can play a construc-
tive role is the development of a central foreign exchange clearinghouse 
akin to the book-entry system used to clear and settle trades in U.S. 
government securities.90 This system would be open all hours of every 
day. Heretofore, limited progress toward such a system has been 
achieved.91 
B. Low Transactions Costs and Liability for Consequential Damages 
"[T]he rules created by law establish implicit prices for different 
kinds of behavior, and the consequences of those rules can be analyzed 
as the response to those implicit prices."92 Legal rules governing 
payment methods are no exception to the principles that every law has 
a cost and that microeconomic tools can be used to study the conse-
quences of the law: 
Every payment instrument imposes a variety of costs on the parties that use 
it. These costs include the financial institution's costs in operating the system, 
which the institution will generally transfer to its customers as a direct or 
88. 58 Fed. Reg. 40,430 (delay announced July 28, 1993). 
89. /d. 
90. Transactions in U.S. Treasuries occur through book-entry debits and credits to accounts 
maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which effectively acts as a clearing and 
settlement system for these securities. Institutions that participate in the private FXNET system 
are able to net on a bilateral basis their spot and forward foreign exchange contracts for the same 
currencies and value dates. International Banking Survey, supra note 82, at 36. The Exchange 
Clearing House Organization (ECHO), in which fourteen European banks participate, allows for 
multilateral netting of spot and forward foreign exchange contracts. See id. The two-day gap 
between the trade and value dates remains, however, as neither FXNET nor ECHO provides 
immediate delivery against payment. 
91. See O'BRIEN, supra note 31, at 29-35. 
92. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at II (emphasis omitted). 
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Indirect charge; the customer's costs of using the instrument, such as the time 
and expense spent getting to a financial institution; and the costs imposed by 
fraud, forgery, and error losses .... All these costs belong to the economic 
category of "transaction costs" because they are attached to an underlying 
transaction. This underlying transaction-typically an exchange of goods or 
services for value-is beneficial to both parties, but the transaction costs 
reduce the value of the exchange, and both parties to the exchange will want 
to minimize them. One concept of economic efficiency is achieving a given 
end at the minimal cost. 93 
Funds transfer law is economically efficient if the payment obligations 
arising from a financial market trade is settled at minimal cost. Costs 
and the consequent incentives or disincentives these costs create for 
financial market players are useful tools in assessing liabilities imposed 
by a funds transfer law. 
The liability rules on interloper fraud and consequential damages in 
a funds transfer law are an important determinant of the cost of funds 
transfers. Providers of funds transfer services do not want to absorb the 
full cost of such fraud and damages and will price the risk of these 
liabilities into their funds transfer fee schedules.94 In tum, this pricing 
will reduce the profitability of financial transactions by narrowing the 
spread between the use and cost of funds. Moreover, funds transfers 
will be a less attractive means of settling payments obligations arising 
from financial transactions, which may result in consideration of 
alternative payments mechanisms. The extent to which traders 
substitute such mechanisms for funds transfers will be measured by the 
price elasticity of demand, 95 but over time traders are likely to make 
adjustments to higher funds transfer service prices. Thus, the demand 
for funds transfers will become more price elastic. 96 
Assume that in the hypothetical 97 Chemical Bank is free to choose 
to pay the Bank of Tokyo by check, cashiers check or funds transfer. 
The check is the cheapest alternative, costing thirty-five cents, but poses 
93. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 67-68 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
94. See U.C.C. § 4A-305 cmt. 2 ("An originator's bank might be willing to assume additional 
responsibilities and incur additional liability in exchange for a higher fee."); see also Hal S. Scott, 
The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737, 759-760 (1978) (explaining that banks involved in check 
collection compensated for court imposed prohibitions of contractual risk-shifting by increasing 
charges to depositors); id. at 784-85 (noting that consumer protection features of laws applicable 
to new payments systems has no distributional gain because "banks will charge consumers, through 
interest rates or card fees, for the bank's cost in assuming statutorily imposed risks"). 
95. "Elasticity of demand is a numerical measure of how responsive demand is to changes 
in price. It is calculated as the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage 
change in price." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 29. 
96. See id. at 30. 
97. See supra part II.B. 
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a credit risk from the Japanese bank's perspective.98 The cashiers 
check is the most expensive alternative, costing five dollars, but 
eliminates the credit risk problem because the check is drawn both on 
and by an acceptable bank. The cost of the funds transfer is more than 
thirty-five cents but less than five dollars. Which payments method 
should be used by the U.S. bank? The most efficient way of paying for 
the yen is the one that creates the greatest surplus in the exchange 
which can then be divided between the Chemical Bank and the Bank of 
Tokyo. This will be the least costly method. Plainly, the funds transfer 
becomes a more appealing payment method to Chemical Bank as the 
relative cost of the funds transfer is reduced. 99 
This cost is reduced in part by Article 4A's general proscription 
against recovering consequential damages from a receiving bank. 100 
This statutory fix, however, is incomplete in two respects~ First, a 
receiving bank may agree in writing to assume consequential damage 
liability, and presumably would do so if it could price the risk of such 
98. The present exposition is adapted from an example provided by Professors Cooter and 
Rubin. Supra note 3, at 68 n.27. 
99. As the hypothetical suggests, assessing the cost of alternative payment methods is, 
ultimately, an empirical question. In contrast, forecasting the extent to which alternative legal 
rules contribute to those costs is a theoretical exercise where those rules have not yet been 
implemented (e.g., the U.N. Model Law) or have been enacted only recently (e.g., U.C.C. Article 
4A). For example, will a receiving bank increase the price of the funds transfer services it 
provides (and if so, by how much) in the absence of a rule that prohibits the imposition of 
consequential damages against the bank without its consent? The answer may depend on an 
analysis of the market in which the bank operates: Is the market perfectly competitive, so that the 
bank faces a horizontal demand curve and is a price-taker? Nonetheless, the present lack of data 
should not bar the formulation of hypotheses about the impact of critical features of the U.N. 
Model Law because such hypotheses may be testable in the future. 
Of course, transaction costs are not the dispositive factor in choice of payment method. The 
funds transfer is by far the fastest method of payment. Funds transfer presents the added 
advantages of high security-because of high-technology procedures to safeguard against 
fraud-and risk reduction-because of settlement guarantees and netting arrangements provided 
through the funds transfer system used. In other words, there are at least three non-price features 
of funds transfer that ought to make it a method of payment distinct from other payment 
mechanisms: low cost, high speed and high security. See generally U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note. 
Nonetheless, lowering the relative cost of a funds transfer enhances its overall comparative 
advantage over other payments devices. 
Extreme cases of inefficient and unreliable means of making payment demonstrate the 
proposition. Consider a countertrade (i.e., barter) transaction where an exporter from a market 
economy is paid in goods or services by an importer that is a state-owned enterprise in a non-
market economy. The exporter is likely to devote considerable attention to the issues of whether 
the goods or services it will receive as payment are adequate in quality and value and whether they 
are delivered on time. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
865-69 (2d ed. 1991). 
100. See U.C.C. § 4A-305(a)-(d). 
688 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
liability and charge its sender accordingly. 101 Contracting out of the 
proscriptive rule could lead to non-uniformity and "undercut [the] 
statute's ability to provide for standard allocations of risk ... and 
preclude economies of scale."102 Allowing parties to contract out of 
the proscription can be justified, however, on the basis that the 
competitive effects it induces will result in more efficient risk alloca-
tion.103 Moreover, a beneficiary's bank faces statutory liability for 
consequential damages if it wrongfully refuses to pay a beneficiary. 104 
In these instances, however, the bank acts intentionally with knowledge 
of the loss it will cause by refusal to pay; thus the recovery under 
U.C.C. Article 4A might resemble the recovery under tort law. 
The U.N. Model Law scheme is less satisfactory to financial market 
traders than Article 4A. Under the U.N. Model Law scheme, banks 
face far greater liabilities and, accordingly, have an increased incentive 
to pass on the risk of incurring such liability to funds transfer users. 105 
Failure to execute a payment order or improper execution of a payment 
order renders a bank liable for any damages provided for under local 
law if the bank acted "with the specific intent to cause loss" or 
"recklessly and with actual knowledge that loss would be likely to 
result."106 Again the statutory result may resemble that which would 
be obtained in tort, but there are two unique uncertainties. First, there 
is no limitation of recovery of consequential damages: "[A]ny remedy 
that may exist"107 is a boundless invitation for plaintiffs. Second, 
there is no guarantee that litigation will arise in an English-based 
common law country, or in a legal system that allows for alternative 
pleading of claims. 108 Thus, any imagined similarity between U.C.C. 
and tort results may vanish. Moreover, the statute's language allows 
even for the imposition of criminal penalties. Here, the suggested 
reform is for the U.N. Model Law to specify a remedy for cases of 
failure to execute a payment order or improper execution of a payment 
order. Alternatively, the U.N. Model Law could allow the parties to 
contractually agree on a remedy by means of a liquidated damages 
clause or other appropriate device. Either solution would eliminate the 
prospect of potentially Draconian and unjustified penalities. 
101. ld. § 4A-305(c) & cmt. 2. 
102. Scott, supra note 94, at 776; see also infra part V. 
103. See Scott, supra note 94, at 776. 
104. U.C.C. § 4A-404(a). 
105. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14, 17, 18. 
106. /d. art. 18. 
107. /d. 
108. Litigation could arise in ajurisdiction in which it is not possible to make claims for relief 
under applicable commercial and tort law. For example, perhaps only specific provisions of the 
commercial portion of a civil code can be cited. 
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IV. SETILEMENTS DEPARTMENTS 
A. Certainty, a Receiver Finality Law and a Discharge Law 
The settlements department is responsible for the end points of the 
funds transfer. When a settlements department implements payment 
instructions arising from a trader's purchase of securities, money-market 
instruments or foreign exchange, its concern is that the underlying 
obligation to pay is discharged. When the trader sells in the market, the 
settlements department focuses on receiving final payment from the 
buyer. In sum, for the settlements department, a funds transfer law 
must provide certainty as to the effect of a funds transfer on the origina-
tor and beneficiary. 
Laws on receiver finality 109 and discharge 110 are essential in a 
funds transfer for the back offices of financial market traders. The 
omission of a receiver finality provision from the U.N. Model Law 
makes it unacceptable because this omission results in uncertainty as to 
when a credit entered into an account as a result of a funds transfer is 
irrevocable. The discharge provision is relegated to a footnote with a 
heading that appears to make the incorporation of the provision into the 
U.N. Model Law even more optional than enacting the Law itself. 111 
The legal status of this footnote is a source of additional uncertain-
ty.112 The U.N. Model Law needs a receiver finality rule, and the 
status of the discharge rule should be that of any other provision. 
Paradoxically, the meaning of uncertainty is not obvious. 113 
Uncertainty should not be considered a generic concept, but considered 
rather in specific factual contexts. From the perspective of an employee 
in the settlements department the relevant questions are: When has my 
bank been paid good funds? When has my bank been discharged from 
109. The U.C.C. Article 4A receiver finality rule provides that once a beneficiary's bank has 
paid the beneficiary, thereby satisfying the bank's obligation to pay the beneficiary arising from 
its acceptance of a payment order on behalf of the beneficiary, the payment is final. See U.C.C. 
§ 4A-40S(a)-(b). The beneficiary's bank cannot recover the payment. !d. § 4A-40S cmt. 2. The 
payment cannot be revoked even if the bank credits the beneficiary's account, but the beneficiary 
has not withdrawn the credit. !d. § 4A-40S(c). The receiver finality rule has two exceptions, one 
for automated clearing house (ACH) credit transfers and one for a major settlement failure on 
CHIPS. See id. § 4A-40S(d)-(e). 
110. !d. § 4A-406(a)-(b) contains the discharge rule which provides that an originator is 
discharged of its underlying contractual obligation to the beneficiary when the beneficiary's bank 
pays the beneficiary which occurs at the time the beneficiary's bank accepts payment. See id. 
Ill. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 19 n.•••. 
112. !d. 
113. See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (regarding the "great deal of uncertainty" that existed 
before the statute). 
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its obligation to pay? Knowing the answers to these questions (or at 
least that answers exist) before a trading institution uses a funds transfer 
to send $1 million to the seller of 120 million yen reduces uncertainty. 
Conversely, the existence of uncertainty requires the trading banks to · 
make decisions based on expected values of outcomes, to consider their 
orientation to risk and to possibly insure against risk. 114 
The classic microeconomic illustration of decisionmaking under 
conditions of uncertainty is to present a business with a choice between 
earning a certain sum of profits with certainty or a higher amount with 
uncertainty. 11s The result is that the business must price the risk of 
the uncertainty and insure against the undesirable outcome. 116 In the 
context of receiver finality and discharge laws, the choice is between 
credits of the same amount, but uncertainty as to their status and effect: 
(I) an irrevocable credit and certainty about discharge, 117 and (2) a 
revocable credit and uncertainty about discharge. . 
Here, too, the rational response involves pricing and insurance. If a 
bank selling 120 million yen at an exchange rate of 120.00 yen per 
dollar knows that the $1 million credited to its account is revocable, 
then it will seek to price the risks that the credit will be revoked and 
that it will have to sue the bank buying the yen on the underlying 
foreign exchange contract for payment of $1 million. By altering the 
dollar-yen spot rate from 120 million yen per $1 million to 119.75 
114. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 55-63. 
115. See, e.g., id. at 55-70. In the classic example, the business faces a choice of( I) $100,000 
with certainty (i.e., a probability of 1.0) if it continues to sell its existing output and (2) $200,000 
with uncertainty (i.e., a probability of less than 1.0) if it introduces a new product line. The 
choice wiii depend, in part, on the expected monetary value of the two outcomes, which is the 
probability of the outcome multiplied by the value of the outcome. /d. at 56-57. Thus, the 
expected monetary value of the first decision is $100,000 (the product of $100,000 and 1.0). If 
the probability of the second outcome is 0. 75, then the expected value is $150,000. The choice 
also will depend on whether the business is risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking. See id. at 58-
62. The greater the degree of risk aversion, the higher the value the business will place on the first 
course of action. See id. at 57. 
116. If the business chooses the uncertain path, then it may seek insurance against the risk that 
income of $200,000 (or at least some amount greater than $1 00,000) will not be earned. See id. 
at 63. Purchasing insurance is one option. Another option is self-insurance, which could entail 
setting aside a contingency pool or reserve. /d. 
The funds needed to pay for insurance premiums or the funds needed to be placed in the 
reserve might be obtained by increasing the price charged to the customers of the business. See 
Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 71 (discussing the principle of loss spreading). When this 
occurs, the business has priced the risk. From the perspective of the customers, the price increase 
is undesirable because their costs have risen. If the output of the business is particularly valued 
or needed by society (e.g., health care) then the marginal increase in cost owing to uncertainty is 
undesirable from a systemic perspective. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at31-32 (discussing 
price inelasticity of demand). 
117. See, e.g., V.C.C. §§ 4A-405, -406. 
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million yen per $1 million, the selling bank can pnce these risks. 
Distorting a market-determined exchange rate on the basis of one 
party's perception of settlement finality risk, however, is not practicable 
in a deep and liquid market like dollar-yen interbank spot trading. No 
single financial institution is likely to have the market power to price 
yen differently based on the payments mechanism used. 
An economy of scale can be achieved by a statutory receiver finality 
rule and certainty of discharge. Indeed, the drafters of U.C.C. Article 
4A left clear evidence of their intent to maximize certainty: 
A deliberate decision was also made to use precise and detailed rules to assign 
responsibility, define behavioral norms, allocate risks and establish limits on 
liability, rather than to rely on broadly stated, flexible principles. In the 
drafting of these rules, a critical consideration was that the various parties to 
funds transfers need to be able to predict risk with certainty, to insure against 
risk, to' adjust operationaf.,and security procedures, and to price funds transfer 
services appropriately. This consideration is particularly important given the 
very large amounts of money that are involved in funds transfers. 118 
The two exceptions to the receiver finality rule do not undermine the 
rule itself. The first exception, relating to funds transfers involving 
automated clearing houses, 119 is relatively narrow and generally 
applies to retail payments transactions. The second exception concerns 
a major settlement failure in a funds-transfer system that nets payment 
obligations on a multilateral basis such as CHIPS. 120 This exception 
does not undermine the rule because of its improbability. There are 
elaborate settlement guarantee rules designed to prevent the meltdown 
that is necessary to trigger the exception. 121 An overt settlement 
guarantee from the central bank is unlikely because of the moral hazard 
problem it would create. 122 Nonetheless, it is also unlikely that the 
Federal Reserve would deny necessary liquidity to net debtor CHIPS 
118. /d. § 4A-102 cmt. (emphasis added). 
119. These are batch transfers that are substitutes for checks. See id. § 4A-405(d) & cmt. 3. 
120. /d. § 4A-405(e) & cmt. 4. 
121. See, e.g., Rules Governing the Clearing House Interbank Payments System, rule 13 (as 
amended through Sept. 22, 1993) [hereinafter CHIPS Rules]. 
122. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 65-66 for a discussion of the moral hazard 
problem in the insurance context. The moral hazard implications of a settlement guarantee are 
apparent. CHIPS participants would have an incentive to incur large net debit positions and 
settling participants would have an incentive to incur large net debit positions. See CHIPS Rules, 
supra note 121, rule l(f) (definition of "debtor settling participant" & rule l(i) (definition of 
"participant"). Settlement risk, and consequently systemic risk, would increase because a debtor 
that failed to settle a large debit position would jeopardize the liquidity position of its creditors. 
Thus, banking regulators are confronted with the moral hazard problem in attempting to reduce 
systemic risk: "Banks' incentives to control the riskiness of their activities could be weakened if 
a perception that central banks will absorb risks or take action to limit their systemic consequences 
is generated." LAMFALUSSY REPORT, supra note 39, at 9. 
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participants (for example, by refusing to make emergency discount 
window loans) to ensure settlement if the Federal Reserve believed that 
the failure of one or more participants would cause a chain reaction of 
settlement failures and deleterious systemic problems. 123 Indeed, the 
improbability of the CHIPS meltdown scenario, coupled with the 
probability of appropriate Federal Reserve action, strengthens the link 
between the base and apex of the inverted pyramid. 124 Traders have 
greater confidence in the finality rules and contingency arrangements. 
A serious threat to the receiver finality rule is posed by the applica-
tion of U.C.C. Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions. A Second 
Circuit case125 in which the court held that foreign exchange is a 
"good" under Article 2126 seems correct under a technical reading of 
section 2-105 of the U.C.C., but upon further reflection is erroneous. 
Foreign exchange represents a credit to a bank account and as such is 
a chose in action. 127 A foreign exchange tran~action involves not "the 
simultaneous trading of money qua goods,"128 but rather the roughly 
contemporaneous exchange of bank credit. Specifically, a credit 
denominated in one currency by one party is delivered to the 
counterparty's designated bank account in exchange for the delivery of 
a credit denominated in a different currency by the counterparty to the 
first party's designated bank account. 129 The application of Article 2 
gives each side the right of reclamation under section 2-702(2). 130 
Yet this result plainly is at odds with the receiver finality rule of U .C.C. 
Section 4A-405(c). 
Unless the Koreag holding is overturned or the U.C.C. definition of 
"good" is modified, 131 every foreign exchange trader within the ambit 
of New York's U.C.C. that sells U.S. dollars and receives delivery of 
123. Presumably, this is one explanation for the intervention of the Federal Reserve when the 
Continental Bank of Illinois faced a liquidity crisis in contrast to the lack of intervention in the 
Drexel Burnham Lambert collapse in 1990. For a discussion of the public policy considerations 
of government bailouts of a private enterprise, see Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: 
Developing A Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L.J. 951 (1992). 
124. See supra note 2. 
125. In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992). 
126. Id at 355. 
127. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 241 (6th ed. 1990). 
128. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 355. 
129. See WEISWEILLER, supra note 23, at 1-2. 
130. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 356. 
131. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1987). Efforts are currently underway by the American Bar 
Association Committee on the U.C.C., Subcommittee on Payments to modifY the definition of 
"goods" to exclude funds transfers (materials on file with author). An alternative resolution is the 
hub-and-spoke approach suggested by Professor Nimmer, in which one spoke of Article 2 would 
apply to foreign exchange transactions. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LICENSE CONTRACTS: 
ARTICLE 2 CODE SECTIONS 14 (1993) (on file with author). 
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a foreign currency faces the possibility that the counterparty will 
reclaim the currency delivered, by revoking the credit in favor of the 
trader. The Koreag court held that the remedy of reclamation132 was 
available to Refco, the seller of U.S. dollars deposited in the bank 
account of the seller's insolvent counterparty .133 A bank selling 
dollars against yen is in precisely the same position as Refco, a prospect 
that will unsettle the selling bank's counterparties. 134 The foreseeable 
effects of Koreag include increased uncertainty in the foreign exchange 
markets whenever one party is potentially subject to New York law and 
attempts to price the risks of reclamation under that statute. Perhaps 
worse, New York is placed at an international competitive disadvantage 
as a center for foreign exchange operations, because parties may take 
their business offshore in order to evade the application of Koreag. 
The interests of both the settlements department and the trader are 
served by receiver finality. Indeed, receiver finality is required because 
of the linkages among certain financial transactions. For example, in 
the hypothetical introduced in Part II.B. the U.S. dollar-Japanese yen 
spot foreign exchange deal is followed by a U.S. dollar-Singapore dollar 
conversion which is then followed by the ST share purchase. A trader 
expecting a credit of funds from one deal who intends to commit those 
funds in a second deal needs the credit to be irrevocable. Thus, the 
Bank of Tokyo not only requires timely delivery of $1 million on day 
three, but requires final payment as well because it intends to purchase 
ST shares immediately. 135 
B. Certainty, Payment Order Processing Laws and a Money-Back 
Guarantee 
The settlements department is focused not only on the end points of 
the funds transfer, but also on its own duties in handling payment 
instructions. 136 Routine methods of processing a large volume of 
payment orders in a short period of time, and black letter rules for 
132. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2). 
133. Koreag, 961 F.2d at 356-57. 
134. In other transactions with the insolvent counterparty, Refco was a buyer of foreign 
currency (like a bank purchasing yen). /d. at 357. Unlike the seller's remedies, the buyer's rights 
under Article 2 do not undermine the Article 4A finality rule because the buyer's remedies do not 
include reclamation. See U.C.C. § 2-711. If a seller breaches, the buyer can cancel the contract 
and refuse to pay. /d. § 2-711(1). The other remedies available to buyers require goods to be 
"identified." /d. § 2-711(2)(a). Bank credits are typically a fungible bulk chose in action in a 
designated account and are not segregated or identifiable. 
135. Accordingly, an argument that receiver finality is unnecessary if payment is made as of 
a certain value date fails because it views one financial market transaction in isolation from other 
related deals. 
136. See KUBARYCH, supra note 32, at 23, 35. 
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dealing with mishaps in directing payment orders and completing funds 
transfers, are essential if the deals negotiated by traders are to be 
properly executed in a timely fashion. Rules that require human 
intervention and the exercise of discretion impede the development of 
rapid, automated payment order processing systems. 137 
The interests of the first and second levels of the inverted pyramid 
converge here. The interest of the settlements department of a bank in 
certainty coalesces with the interests of the trading department of that 
bank in high speed and low transactions costs. Human payment order 
processing and judgment calls are time-consuming and expensive. 138 
This similarity of interests is important because it contributes to risk 
reduction. The obvious benefit from a funds transfer law that engenders 
rapid payment order processing is the reduction of settlement risk. 139 
Risk exposure is extended as payment order processing is slowed 
because the creditor institution must wait longer for settlement from its 
counterparty. The less apparent benefit of rapid payment order 
processing involves market risk. The larger the volume of trading 
activity the more likely it is that the positions taken by different traders 
in the same institution will offset or hedge one another, thereby 
reducing market risk. 140 The London branch of a U.S. bank may have 
a net long position in yen, while the Tokyo branch of the same bank 
may have a net short position. From the perspective of the New York 
headquarters of the bank-as well as that of the Federal Reserve 
examiners who check the market risk to which the bank as a whole is 
exposed-these offsetting positions are healthy because the bank is at 
least partially hedged against a quick appreciation or depreciation in the 
value of yen against major currencies. 
Finally, the trading and settlements departments' common interests 
in rapid, low cost systems have a practical dimension: generating larger 
profits from increasing trading volumes. Back offices must cope with 
a large volume of payment orders generated by the traders' financial 
deals while not stifling trading activity. No trader wants to learn that 
increasing trading activity volumes and the opportunity for increased 
profits (as well as individual bonuses) cannot be accommodated because 
"the plumbing is clogged." In the worst case, the number of deals a 
. trader can enter into each funds-transfer business day will be deter-
mined by the number of payment orders the back office can process. 
137. See U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2 (explaining the high-speed, automated means for processing 
payment orders). 
138. /d. § 4A-207 cmt. 2. 
139. See supra notes II, 51-57 and accompanying text. 
140. See JOINT DERIVATIVES STUDY, supra note 9, at 17. 
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The payment order processing rules of U.C.C. Article 4A that allow 
receiving banks to rely on account numbers instead of names should be 
weighed against the above considerations. 141 Whether the computers 
that handle payment orders can process figures or words more quickly 
is a technological issue. The legal right to rely on one or the other, 
however, facilitates automated processing. This is particularly true 
when it is coupled with the absence of a duty to check for mismatches 
between account names and numbers in a payment order. 142 
The U.N. Model Law, in contrast, provides no unequivocal statement 
that a receiving bank is free to rely on an account number. 143 For the 
interests of the back offices to be met, the U.N. Model Law must be 
amended to include the rules of U.C.C. sections 4A-207(b) and 4A-
208(a)(l), which provide necessary guidance!44 The amendment is 
urgently needed in light of the liability of a beneficiary's bank for 
misdirected payment orders. 145 The originator, not the bank, is in the 
best position to insure that the name and account number of the 
beneficiary stated in a payment order are correct because the originator 
received payment instructions from the beneficiary. 146 To place the 
onus for consistency between name and number on the beneficiary's 
bank without clarifying that the bank has no duty to check for inconsis-
tencies is an inefficient allocation. 
Settlements departments in receiving banks that detect problems in a 
payment order should not have a statutory duty to notify senders of the 
problematic payment orders. The U.N. Model Law errs by making 
receiving banks insurers against "insufficient data" in a payment 
order147 and "inconsistenc[ies] in the information relating to the 
141. A beneficiary's bank that is unaware of a mismatch between the name and account 
number of the beneficiary in the payment order received by the bank is free to rely on the number 
and need not determine whether the name and number identify the same party. U.C.C. § 4A-
207(b)(l). 
142. See id. §§ 4A-207(b) (applicable to a beneficiary's banks) & 208(a)(l) (applicable to a 
receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank). See also id. § 4A-207 cmt. 2. 
143. Compare U.N. MODEL LAW arts. 8 & 10 (differing treatment ofreceiving banks' ability 
to rely on identifying account number) with U.C.C. §§ 4A-207 & 4A-208. 
144. Essentially, the U.C.C. rules allow a receiving bank to process payment orders based 
solely on account numbers specified in the orders. U.C.C. §§ 4A-207(b), -208(a)(l ). These 
sections also make clear that the bank has no duty to examine orders for inconsistencies between 
the account numbers and the account names. /d. §§ 4A-207(b), -208(a)(l). 
145. See U.N. MODEL LAW art. 10(4). 
146. See U.C.C. § 4A-207 cmt. 2. For example, the International Swap Dealers Association 
(ISDA) Master Agreement and the Foreign Exchange Committee International Currency Options 
(ICOM) Agreement call upon the parties to exchange payment instruction information in the 
schedules attached to the agreements. See ISDA Master Agreement (unpublished document, on 
file with author) & ICOM Master Agreement (unpublished document, on file with author). 
147. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 8(4) (applicable to a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's 
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amount of money to be transferred." 148 The efficient way for a settle-
ments department to handle such orders is rejection: put simply, if the 
sender cannot get it right, then the receiving bank should not have to 
investigate up the funds transfer chain. The U.N. Model Law require-
ment that a receiving bank notify an identifiable sender of insufficien-
cies and inconsistencies149 compares unfavorably with the U.C.C. 
Article 4A scheme. In U.C.C. Article 4A, the intentional manipulation 
of the concept of acceptance by a beneficiary's bank releases prior 
senders from their obligations to pay for payment orders. 150 
The U.C.C. Article 4A laws are not self-contained, however, and 
create a moral hazard problem for those who originate payment orders. 
Allocating the loss to a beneficiary's bank that pays a beneficiary when 
the bank is aware ofa name-account number mismatch in the payment 
order is efficient because the bank is plainly able to prevent payment to 
an unintended beneficiary by rejecting the order in the first place. The 
beneficiary's bank must proceed against an unintended beneficiary that 
it paid to get funds back, but the applicable law may be unclear and 
may vary across jurisdictions. The originator has no incentive to · 
exercise any level of care in designating the name and account number 
· of the beneficiary when it issues its payment order because "Article 4A 
makes irrelevant the issue of whether [the originator] was or was not 
negligent in issuing its payment order."ISI 
A more subtle scenario further illustrates the potential difficulties 
presented by U.C.C. Article 4A. Only an originator that is a "bank" is 
expected to understand "how payment orders are processed and 
paid. " 152 An originator issuing a payment order with an inconsistent 
designation of the beneficiary is not liable to pay for the order unless 
the receiving bank served prior notice that it would rely on the account 
number in the payment order. 153 The dividing line between banks and 
bank); see also id. art. 10(2) (applicable to a beneficiary's bank). 
148. /d. art. 8(5) (applicable to a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank); see also 
id. art. 10(4) (applicable to a beneficiary's bank). 
149. ld. arts. 8(4)-(5) (applicable to a receiving bank other than a beneficiary's bank) & 10(2)-
(4) (applicable to a beneficiary's bank). Notice must be provided only if the sender can be 
identified. /d. art. 8(4)-(5). 
ISO. Under U.C.C. § 4A-207(b)(2), if a beneficiary's bank receives a payment order and 
knows that the name and account number of the beneficiary do not match, but nevertheless pays 
the beneficiary, then no acceptance occurred. U.C.C. § 4A-207(b)(2). Because acceptance is the 
event that triggers a sender's obligation to pay for its order under U.C.C. § 4A-402(b), the sender's 
obligation does not mature. /d. § 4A-402(b). In turn, because the beneficiary's bank did not 
accept the order, the money-back guarantee of U.C.C. § 4A-402(c) assures each prior sender of 
a credit to the sender's account. ld. § 4A-402(c)-(d). 
151. /d. § 4A-207 cmt. 2. 
152. ld. § 4A-207 cmt. 3. 
153. Id. § 4A-207(c)(2). 
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non-banks, however, is not made much clearer by the definition of 
"bank" in U.C.C. Section 4A-105(a)(2). 154 Thus, the scope of 
application of the rule is uncertain. 
A money-back guarantee assures the settlements department that an 
incomplete funds transfer is not a black hole. 155 Without the guaran-
tee, the risk of losing funds must be priced and incorporated into the 
overall transaction costs associated with settling a payments obligation 
that arises from a purchase of securities, money-market instruments or 
foreign currency. Alternatively, a contractual way to efficiently allocate 
the risk must be used. The statutory rule yields economies of scale by 
removing the need to resort to a contract on each settlement. 
While the guarantee in U.C.C. Article 4A is unequivocal, the 
language of the Model Law on this point results in uncertainty: The 
money-back guarantee "may not be varied by agreement except when 
a prudent originator's bank would not have otherwise accepted a 
particular payment order because of a significant risk involved in the 
credit transfer."156 The italicized terms render the rule hopelessly 
unworkable. Even the best expert witnesses from the leading. central 
banks are unlikely to agree either on "prudence" or on whether the risk 
(of unspecified type) was "significant." The U.C.C. Article 4A 
guarantee should be the model for the U.N. Model Law to better serve 
the interests of the players at the second level of the inverted pyramid. 
C. Interloper Fraud and the Efficient Allocation of Risk 
Modem day electronic pirates abound and threaten the integrity ofthe 
system for settling payment obligations arising from financial market 
trading. The back office is both a receiver and a sender of payment 
orders generated by trading activity. 157 In each role, the back office's 
interest is the efficient allocation of liability in the event a pirate is 
successful in electronically raiding a bank account. A security 
154. The definition of bank is "a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a 
savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union and trust company. A branch or separate 
office of a bank is a separate bank for purposes of this Article." /d. § 4A-1 05(a)(2). · 
155. Each sender of a payment order is entitled to a credit with interest of any funds paid for 
its order if the funds transfer is not completed; a transfer is completed only if the beneficiary's 
bank accepts an order for the beneficiary. See id. §§ 4A-402(c), -104(a). Only a sender that 
designates an intermediary bank which subsequently fails loses this protection. /d. § 4A-402(e). 
156. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(2) (emphasis added). 
157. The settlements department receives orders after trades are made, and it executes the 
orders by issuing conforming payment orders. U.C.C. § 4A-30l(a) (providing the definition of 
"execution" for a receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank). 
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procedure158 to verify the authenticity of payment orders is the anti-
piracy device. 1s9 
It is a clerk in the back office and not a trader seated on the trading 
floor who deals with the pirate and who, therefore, must sort out bona 
fide payment orders from payment orders of pirates. As a receiver, the 
settlements department wants a security procedure to provide the 
necessary sorting. Conversely, a sender that fails to take precautions to 
protect its payment order transmission mechanisms is likely to be 
charged an extra fee by the receiving banks to which it issues payment 
orders. These banks will price the risk of interloper fraud and pass this 
cost back to the sender. Accordingly, a "commercially reasonable" 
security procedure160 both affords protection to the settlements depart-
ment as a sender and reduces the receiving bank's incentive to increase 
its funds transfer service fees to insure against interloper fraud loss. 161 
There is no comparative negligence analysis under the U.N. Model 
Law162 or U.C.C. Article 4A. 163 Either the innocent customer or the 
158. /d. § 4A-201. The term used in the U.N. Model Law is "authentication." U.N. MODEL 
LAW art. 2(i). 
159. The significance ofinterloper fraud rules also are apparent from the back office's interest 
in certainty. As a receiver, the instructions the back office receives to transfer funds after a trader 
purchases securities, money market instruments or foreign exchange must be bona fide. 
Uncertainty is costly: receiving banks will seek to increase the prices they charge for accepting 
payment orders from their customers. This price increase will represent an increase in transaction 
costs because the cost of satisfying payment obligations such as the delivery of $1 million in a 
dollar-yen spot foreign exchange agreement rises. Such an increase in transaction costs is 
inconsistent with the macroeconomic aim of accommodating a growing volume of financial 
transactions. A security procedure designed to test the authenticity of payment orders issued by 
a sender to a receiving bank reduces uncertainty. The need to incorporate into the price of funds 
transfer services the risk of liability for interloper fraud is correspondingly lessened. 
160. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b)-(c); U.N. MODEL LAw art. 5(2)(a). 
161. The fee schedule of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York illustrates the point. The fee 
for originating a funds transfer is fifty-three cents per transfer if the originator uses the On-Line 
Security Procedure, which incorporates an electronic computer transmission. If the originator uses 
the Off-Line Security Procedure, however, the transfer fee is $10.00 per transfer. FED. REsERVE 
BANK OF N.Y., FUNDS TRANSFERS THROUGH FEDWIRE, OPERATING CIRCULAR NO. 8, at App. A 
(Jan. I, 1991), App. E (Jan. I, 1993). 
162. Under the U.N. Model Law, liability initially is allocated to the purported sender. A 
purported sender is bound by a payment order issued in its name (and, therefore, must pay for the 
order) if the authentication "is in the circumstances . . . commercially reasonable" and the 
receiving bank complied with the security procedure. U.N. MODEL LAw art. 5(2)(a). As a second 
step, liability can be reallocated to the receiving bank. /d. art. 6. The purported sender-who is, 
after all, an innocent customer of the receiving bank-can shift liability back to the receiving bank 
if it proves that the fraud was not perpetrated by an insider. /d. art. 5(4). The receiving bank, 
however, can rebut this not-an-insider defense and again place liability on the purported sender 
by showing that the purported sender acted with fault. /d. The U.N. Model Law states that the 
defense does not apply "if the receiving bank proves that the payment order resulted from the 
actions of a person who had gained access to the authentication procedure through the fault of the 
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receiving bank bears the full loss. In designing a loss allocation rule, 
three principles of economic efficiency are relevant: 164 loss spread-
ing, 165 loss reduction 166 and loss imposition. 167 The object is to 
purported sender." /d. In sum, liability is all-or-nothing and is determined using a ping-pong 
procedure. 
163. The Article 4A rules are summarized as follows: 
In a large percentage of cases, the payment order of the originator of the funds transfer 
is transmitted electronically to the originator's bank. In these cases it may not be 
possible for the bank to know whether the electronic message has been authorized by 
its customer. To ensure that no unauthorized person is transmitting messages to the 
bank, the normal practice is to establish security procedures that usually involve the use 
of codes or identifying numbers or words. If the bank accepts a payment order that 
purports to be that of its customer after verifying its authenticity by complying with a 
security procedure agreed to by the customer and the bank, the customer is bound to 
pay the order even if it was not authorized. But there is an important limitation on this 
rule. The bank is entitled to payment in the case of an unauthorized order only if the 
court finds that the security procedure was a commercially reasonable method of 
providing security against unauthorized payment orders. The customer can also avoid 
liability if it can prove that the unauthorized order was not initiated by an employee or 
other agent of the customer having access to confidential security information or by a 
person who obtained that information from a source controlled by the customer . . . . 
If the bank accepts an unauthorized payment order without verifying it in compliance 
with a security procedure, the loss falls on the bank. 
U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note 28 U.L.A. 461-62 (1989) (emphasis added). The rules are set forth 
in U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to -204. 
As discussed above, there are three critical steps in analyzing this legal scheme: the agreement, 
commercial reasonability and the not-an-insider defense. 
164. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 70. 
165. The loss spreading principle states that liability for loss due to fraud should be assigned 
to the party that can achieve risk neutrality at the lowest cost. /d. at 71. A definition of risk 
aversion is that "a person is said to be [] risk averse if she considers the utility of a certain 
prospect of money income to be higher than the expected utility of an uncertain prospect of equal 
expected monetary value." COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 58. A risk averse person facing a 
possible loss will pay more than the average value of the loss to eliminate the risk of the loss. 
Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 70-71. A person who is indifferent between a certain prospect 
of money income and an uncertain prospect of money income of equal expected monetary value 
is risk neutral. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 4, at 62. In the context of losses, a risk neutral 
person places a value on risk equal to the average value of the loss. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 
3, at 71. 
166. There are four aspects of loss reduction: precaution, innovation, responsiveness and 
learning. LiabilitY should be assigned to the party that is: (I) able to adopt precautionary 
measures against loss at the lowest cost; (2) most likely to develop innovative methods of 
precaution over time; (3) influenced by the assignment ofliability; and (4) most able to learn about 
its liabilities and adopt its behavior accordingly. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 73, 84. 
"Precaution" means adopting safeguards against loss. /d. at 73-74. "Innovation" refers to 
precaution in a dynamic context in which a party develops new ways of reducing loss based on 
technological breakthroughs. /d. at 74-75. Assigning liability to a party whose behavior in terms 
of precaution or innovation is not influenced by the assignment is economically unjustifiable. /d. 
at 75. "Responsiveness" is the economic way of thinking about Skinnerian behavior modification 
(i.e., stimulus-response). /d. at 75. "Learning" places responsiveness in a dynamic context: In 
700 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
devise a loss allocation rule consistent with the recommendations that 
result from the application of these principles to specific facts. 168 
With respect to loss spreading, there are two reasons that financial 
institutions are more likely than individual customers to achieve risk 
neutrality. Financial institutions have greater economic resources169 
and they can spread the loss more effectively. 170 Accordingly, the 
loss spreading principle yields the practical recommendation that fraud 
losses should be placed on banks. 171 This recommendation ignores 
other factors and principles and was formulated in the context of 
consumer payment methods like checks. 172 It cannot, therefore, be 
accepted in the funds transfer context. The typical user of funds 
transfer services is a large financial institution. A loss from fraud, 
therefore, may be a small percentage of its wealth and such losses may 
be predictable. In the context of the hypothetical described in Part 
II.B., Chase Manhattan does not necessarily have a comparative 
advantage over Chemical Bank in spreading loss. This is an empirical 
issue incapable of a priori resolution. Thus, an unequivocal recommen-
dation about loss allocation from interloper fraud cannot be based on 
the loss spreading principle. Whether the initial allocation of liability 
under the U.N. Model Law to the purported sender is efficient turns on 
the principles of loss reduction and loss imposition. 
On balance, the application of the four elements of loss reduction173 
to the problem of interloper fraud in funds transfers does not result in 
a straight measuring stick with which to evaluate the U.N. Model Law 
scheme. 174 The hypothetical of Part II.B. can be used to illustrate. 
Whether Chemical Bank or Chase Manhattan can adopt precautionary 
measures at a lower cost is not prima facie clear. Conventional analysis 
states that "[t]he precaution element is unrelated to the size and nature 
the long run, a party will learn about the potential liability it faces and conform its behavior to the 
law. !d. at 75-76. 
167. While the focus of the loss spreading and loss reduction principles is on assigning 
liability, the focus of the loss imposition is on enforcement of the assigned liability. !d. at 78. 
"To achieve efficiency ... the enforcement process should be as inexpensive as possible." /d. 
Liability rules that are simple, clear and decisive increase efficiency because they shift liability to 
the appropriate party with minimal litigation costs. !d. 
168. /d. at 84. 
169. I.e., the losses are small in proportion to their wealth. /d. at 71. 
170. I.e., the losses are small and predictable. /d. at 71-72. 
171. /d. at 71-72, 84. 
172. !d. at 71, 84. 
173. The elements are precaution, innovation, responsiveness and learning. See supra note 
166. 
174. This is not surprising, as Professors Cooter and Rubin point out that even in the consumer 
payments context the loss reduction principal "is generally neutral between financial institutions 
and consumers." Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 84. 
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of the party; its detennining factor is the party's position in the payment 
transaction."175 Accordingly, the fact that Chemical Bank and Chase 
Manhattan are roughly equal-sized giants should not obfuscate matters. 
Moreover, the conventional analysis is easier to apply to situations 
where only one party is involved in a payments activity 176 than to the 
issuance and acceptance of a payment order, which plainly involves a 
sender and a receiving bank. 
Indeed, the situation is one of bilateral precaution: both parties can 
adopt safeguards at low cost, and more data are needed to detennine 
which of the two parties has the greater capacity for precaution. An 
additional problem is that such data are static, while the relative 
capacities of the parties are likely to change as the financial health of 
the parties alters. These problems suggest that liability should be fault-
based, as it is in the U.N. Model Law, because the paradox of precau-
tions is avoided. 177 
Evaluated in these tenns, the U.N. Model Law scheme is efficient. 
The sender has an incentive to avoid losses because, if the receiving 
bank complies with a commercially reasonable security procedure that 
has been agreed to, the sender is liable. 178 The sender presumably 
takes care to monitor employees and other insiders, and to keep secure 
its wire room wherein confidential infonnation about the authentication 
device is stored. The receiving bank also has an incentive to avoid 
losses. The receiving bank cannot retain funds it debited from the 
purported sender's account to pay for a payment order if it did not 
comply with the procedure or the procedure was not commercially 
reasonable. 179 
Examination ofthe innovation and responsiveness elements indicates 
that, in contrast to the precaution element, they do correlate with the 
175. /d. at 76 (footnote omitted). 
176. E.g., a bank encoding a check or a drawer handing a check to another party. 
177. The paradox is that "[a]ny fault rule, including simple negligence, negligence with a 
contributory negligence defense, and comparative negligence, will motivate one party to satisfy 
the legal standard of fault in order to avoid liability, while inducing the other party to take 
precaution because it must bear any residual responsibility for the loss." Cooter & Rubin, supra 
note 3, at 74 (footnote omitted). As Professors Cooter and Rubin point out, "[b)ilateral precaution 
characterizes most false positive situations[]" (wherein an invalid payment instruction such as a 
forged check is followed). /d. at 89. Whether the capped consumer liability rule is appropriate 
in the wholesale funds transfer context is debatable. See id. at 90, 97. The "consumers" in this 
context are sophisticated financial institutions and the law of diminishing returns on responsiveness 
with increases in liability may not apply until a high minimum threshold of liability is reached. 
Of course, a separate issue that must be considered is the cost of determining fault in a fault-based 
system. 
178. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 5(2). 
179. /d. 
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size and nature of the parties. 18° Financial institutions are more likely 
than consumers to innovate and respond to legal incentives. 181 
Analysis of these elements does little to assist in the determination of 
risk allocation in the funds transfer context, because it is unclear which 
party is most likely to develop innovative methods of precaution over 
time. Applied in the context of consumer payment methods, the data 
suggest financial institutions are more likely to research, develop and 
implement high-technology, anti-fraud devices. 182 In the funds 
transfer context, the sending bank seems no less likely to spawn better 
authentication devices than the receiving bank. 
Analysis of the responsiveness element also yields an unsatisfactory 
result. In the hypothetical transaction, both Chemical Bank and Chase 
Manhattan are likely to be armed with legal teams and compliance 
officers, capable of rapidly digesting a new funds transfer law and 
altering behavior accordingly. 183 Whether one is in a better position 
to respond than the other is prima facie unclear, although the situation 
is probably one of bilateral responsiveness. This seems also to be the 
case with respect to the learning element. 
The loss imposition principle suggests that the fault rule in the U.N. 
Model Law is inefficient. Strict liability, as opposed to fault-based 
liability, is simple, clear and decisive. 184 Strict liability is also cheap-
er to implement because it generates less civil discovery and motion 
practice. 185 Strict liability, however, is not the result suggested by the 
bilateral precaution analysis. 186 
The bottom line is that the U.N. Model Law scheme for allocating 
loss is consistent with the precautionary element of the loss reduction 
principle and at odds with the loss imposition principle. Application of 
the loss reduction principle yields this inconclusive result in the funds 
transfer context primarily because the typical senders and receiving 
banks are similar: both categories are populated by large financial 
institutions trading foreign exchange, money-market instruments and 
securities. The principle can be applied more simply to consumer 
payment methods like checks and credit cards because the users and 
providers of the payments services have distinct attributes that produce 
clear differences in actual and potential abilities. The conventional 
180. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 77. 
181. /d. 
182. See id. at 76-77. 
183. See id. at 81. 
184. See id. at 74. 
185. See id. at 78-79, 85. 
186. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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analysis does not necessarily lack merit, but more facts are needed. 187 
Specifically, more facts about the size, nature and position of the 
senders and receiving banks are needed for a full analysis. 
V. FUNDS TRANSFER SYSTEMS 
A. Systemic Risk and Variation by Agreement 
To serve the interests of financial market players, funds transfer law 
must address their systemic concerns. Yet, funds transfer law ostensibly 
has little to say about systemic risk. The term "systemic risk" is not 
used in U.C.C. Article 4A or the U.N. Model Law. If, however, funds 
transfer systems are to develop innovative methods of systemic risk 
reduction, the legal status of the system and its rules should be clear. 
Such clarity would enable system participants to implement systemic 
risk reduction efforts in an environment of greater legal certainty. 
Moreover, funds transfer law should allow for variation by agreement 
by system rules. 
A critical defect of the U.N. Model Law is that it does not appro-
priately recognize the existence of funds transfer systems and their 
rules. Indeed, the U.N. Model Law fails to define the term "funds 
transfer system." Whether a funds transfer system rule can bind non-
participant third parties or whether it can vary inconsistent provisions 
of the U.N. Model Law are unresolved issues.' 88 Whether the fruits 
of systemic risk reduction efforts of the participants in a funds transfer 
system can be realized also is unclear. 
The neglect is not a result of ignorance. The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) delegates plainly 
were aware of the existence of funds transfer systems: The term is used 
once in the U.N. Model Law. Article 14(6) deals with the "skip rule" 
problem of an intermediary bank's failure coupled with an incomplete 
credit transfer. 189 UNCITRAL delegates may have chosen to other-
wise ignore funds transfer systems deliberately. The delegates may 
have feared that an express recognition of Fedwire, CHIPS and other 
funds transfer systems in developed countries would result in a 
competitive advantage to these existing systems. If the U.N. Model 
187. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 84. 
188. Compare U.C.C. § 4A-50l(b) with U.N. MODEL LAW art. 4. 
189. Generally, a bank obligated to make a refund pursuant to the money-back guarantee can 
skip over a failed intermediary bank and pay a prior sender directly. U.N. MODEL LAW art. 14(4). 
The exception to this rule applies if the bank's rights or obligations under the rules of a funds 
transfer system in which the bank participates would be affected. /d. art. 14(6). 
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Law recognized these funds transfers systems-and allowed them to 
vary the U.N. Model Law by contract-financial market players would 
choose to use Fedwire and CHIPS. This choice by UNCITRAL 
delegates is unfortunate, because the systems are well-established. The 
U.N. Model Law should acknowledge that Fedwire and CHIPS are 
significant money movers. 
In contrast, funds transfer systems are hardly ghosts in Article 4A. 
In Article 4A the legal status of system rules is clear: System rules 
governing participants may be effective even if they conflict with 
Article 4A. 190 Moreover, the third-party problem is resolved. A 
funds transfer system rule is effective even if it both conflicts with 
Article 4A and affects non-consenting parties, and the rule may govern 
the rights and obligations of non-participants. 191 Systemic risk is the 
reason for certain provisions in Article 4A 192 and the CHIPS 
Rules. 193 The object of those provisions is to support funds transfer 
system rules that deal with systemic risk. Whether this is also the case 
with article 14(6) of the U.N. Model Law is unclear because the skip 
rule problem is a limited one with little systemic dimensions. 
Professor Scott's explanation that "parties to a transaction may accept 
optional statutory provisions . . . because the cost of contracting out of 
them is greater than the efficiencies that might be achieved through 
such variation[]"194 must be supplemented. The analysis of optional 
rules need not be limited to a cost-benefit calculation, but should be 
expanded to include the innovation element of the loss reduction 
principle identified by Professors Cooter and Rubin. 195 Through 
funds transfer system rules, 196 a funds transfer system can implement 
methods of precaution over time to reduce losses associated with 
systemic risk. A necessary prerequisite, however, is that the legal 
190. U.C.C. § 4A-501(b). 
191. /d. 
192. See, e.g., id. § 4A-405. 
193. CHIPS rule 13, which sets forth a settlement guarantee mechanism, is such a rule. 
CHIPS Rules, supra note 121, rule 13. If one or more CHIPS participants fail to settle their net 
debit positions, then the remaining solvent participants will contribute appropriate amounts to 
effect settlement. /d. U.C.C. section 4A-405(e) applies if the CHIPS settlement guarantee 
algorithm is unsuccessful and an unwind of positions is required. Article 4A allows an exception 
to the receiver finality rule in this instance. U.C.C. § 4A-405 cmt. 4. To be sure, these provisions 
were drafted in consultation with the Federal Reserve. 
194. Scott, supra note 94, at 739. 
195. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 3, at 73-77. 
196. This is "a rule of an association of banks (i) governing transmission of payment orders 
by means of a funds-transfer system of the association or rights and obligations with respect to 
those orders, or (ii) to the extent the rule governs rights and obligations between banks that are 
parties to a funds transfer in which a Federal Reserve Bank, acting as an intermediary bank, sends 
the payment order to a beneficiary's bank." U.C.C. § 4A-501(b). 
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regime in which the system operates encourages participants in the 
system to generate new risk-reduction ideas and guarantees the legal 
enforceability of funds transfer system rules. If two or more systems 
operate in the same or similar markets (as do CHIPS and Fedwire), 
there is a potential for healthy competitive variation in risk-reduction 
measures implemented through different funds transfer system rules. 
Interestingly, systemic risk reduction programs involving the central 
bank may raise a moral hazard problem. The Federal Reserve has 
never expressly committed to providing liquidity to CHIPS to ensure 
settlement finality. While it is inconceivable that appropriate support 
would not be forthcoming, this does not mean that discount window 
loans will be made to troubled CHIPS participants. 197 If financial 
market transactors know with certainty that their counterparties will be 
bailed out, then there is no incentive to evaluate the credit risk of those 
counterparties or attempt privately negotiated risk-reduction arrange-
ments. Bilateral and multilateral netting schemes are such risk-
reduction arrangements; it is not surprising that the Federal Reserve has 
looked on these with favor. From the bank regulator's perspective 
funds transfer law should, therefore, accommodate the development of 
netting schemes. 
B. Trade-D.ffs 
The difficulty with the Article 4A approach to funds transfer systems 
is that it fails to resolve underlying trade-offs between private rules and 
statutory law and, more fundamentally, between freedom of contract 
and legal compulsion. Suppose that Article 4A was completely variable 
by agreement. 198 There would be no limits on the systemic risk 
reduction efforts of funds transfer system participants or on the 
competitive variation of rules in different systems. Two adverse 
consequences follow from the legal protection of private rules. First, 
risk fixing199 could result, and public law would be needed to control 
risk allocation between banks and customers. One must distinguish 
197. The failure of the Federal Reserve to lend to Drexel Burnham Lambert is a case in point. 
See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
198. The non-uniform provision in section S-102(4) ofNew York's U.C.C. is analogous to this 
supposition. N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1994). The account party 
and issuing bank in a letter of credit transaction are free to opt out of Article S in favor of the 
Uniform Customs and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits. 1NT'L CHAMBER OF CoM., 
UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL DocUMENTARY CREDITS (1984). 
199. Professor Scott rightly characterizes risk fixing as functionally equivalent to price fixing. 
HAL S. SCOTT, NEW PAYMENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT TO THE 3-4-8 COMMITTEE OF THE 
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 35-36 (1978) (hereinafter 
3-4-8 REPORT). 
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between users and consumers when discussing risk allocation. 
Although risk allocation between banks and customers in the context of 
consumer payment systems may be needed, in the funds transfer context 
it may not. Participants in a funds transfer system are both users and 
providers of the system's services. A more ominous possible result of 
fixed risk allocation is tacit collusion among funds transfer systems to 
allocate risks among participants and thereby minimize competition 
among systems. 
The second adverse consequence of legal protection of private rules 
is that economies of scale in risk allocation might be lost. Assume that 
participants are free to vary the money-back guarantee by agreement. 
Although this assumption is at odds with the current Article 4A 
rule,200 it would provide greater certainty than that afforded under the 
U.N. Model Law.201 Payment orders would have to be sorted into 
two categories: those orders whose senders had agreed by contract to 
waive the guarantee and those whose senders contractually elected to 
be covered by the guarantee.202 Operating two payment order pro-
cessing systems would be expensive and jeopardize economies of 
scale.203 Ideally, the cost of operating two systems should be allocat-
ed to those senders who opt for the guarantee on the grounds that it 
would not otherwise be offered.204 Eliminating the ability of parties 
to vary Article 4A would avoid the marginal cost of two systems, allow 
the cost of one system to be spread evenly among all users and assure 
economies of scale. 
The trade-offs become more difficult to resolve when the Federal 
Reserve is considered in its roles as both a funds transfer system 
sponsor and a regulator of participants in competitor systems.205 As 
long as Federal Reserve Banks offer a priced service that competes with 
one offered by private sector players that it regulates, a potential 
conflict of interest exists between these roles. 206 
Even if Fedwire were privatized by being sold to commercial banks 
to operate, freedom of contract would be illusive.207 As the statute 
200. U.C.C. § 4A-402(f). 
201. The U.N. Model Law contains problematic language in the money-back guarantee 
provision. See U.N. MODEL LAw art. 14(2). 
202. See Professor Scott's analysis in the context of check collection and the risk of loss from 
a forged drawer's signature in 3-4-8 REPORT, supra, note 199, at 40-41. 
203. Id. 
0 
204. Indeed, as a participant in the drafting of Article 4A, the Author noted that the money-
back guarantee appeared to be the protection obtained by large corporate users of funds transfer 
services in return for agreeing to a limit on the liability of banks for consequential damages. 
205. I.e., CHIPS. 
206. See CHARLES GooDHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS, 6-7, 86-102 (1988). 
207. See generally Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753 
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itself states, Federal Reserve regulations and Reserve Bank operating 
circulars supersede inconsistent provisions of Article 4A.208 Although 
the scope of Federal Reserve Regulation J is the same as that of a funds 
transfer system rule,209 the rules of Fedwire are federal regulations, 
not a system's rules. In contrast, the CHIPS Rules lack such legal 
authority. CHIPS Rules are subordinate to Article 4A unless the 
adopting statute states that Article 4A may be varied by a funds transfer 
system rule. 210 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Funds transfer law should not be critically evaluated from a transac-
tion-neutral perspective, but rather judged in the context of the 
international financial market interest groups it principally affects. The 
markets for foreign exchange, short-term money instruments, corporate 
securities, derivative products and interbank funds generate the bulk of 
wire transfer activity. Because the catalysts for large-value funds 
transfers are financial market deals, the nature of the interest groups in 
the financial markets and their relative positions must be understood 
before the macroeconomic success of funds transfer law can be gauged. 
Funds transfer law must be held to the test of meeting the interests of 
the groups it most prominently affects: financial institutions transacting 
in foreign exchange, short-term money market instruments, corporate 
securities, derivative products and interbank lending. 
This Article has argued that microeconomic and banking concepts 
provide the critical tools to gauge whether the law supports trading 
activities, clearing and settlement procedures, and funds transfer 
systems. The essence of the test must be to employ fundamental 
microeconomic and banking concepts to measure the extent to which 
U.C.C. Article 4A and the U.N. Model Law satisfy the interests of 
traders, settlements departments and funds transfer systems. 
The same-day execution rules contained in U.C.C. Article 4A are 
problematic because of the potential for delays inherent in a beneficiary 
bank's acceptance of a payment order for the beneficiary. The U.N. 
Model Law rule is unsatisfactory because of the potential for cumulative 
delays in paying the beneficiary and administrative difficulties in 
passing value as of a certain date. Both rules could be improved by 
tightening the time deadlines for action by receiving banks, thereby 
(1981) (arguing that contradiction and discontinuity vitiate the principle of freedom of contract). 
208. U.C.C. § 4A-107. 
209. 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(b)(2)(v) (1993). 
210. See U.C.C. § 4A-501 cmt. I. 
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meeting the traders' interest in high-speed funds transfers. The open 
invitation in the U.N. Model Law for draconian remedies in the cases 
of failure to execute a payment order and improper ·execution of a 
payment order is troubling because of the increase in transaction costs 
it is likely to provoke. Correcting this defect will serve the traders' 
interests in minimizing costs. 
The U.N. Model Law affords little certainty to settlements depart-
ments because of the lack of a receiver finality rule and the question-
able status of the discharge rule. The failure of the U.N. Model Law 
to clarify certain payment order processing matters heightens the uncer-
tainty. Both the U.N. Model Law and U.C.C. Article 4A appear to 
meet the interest of settlements departments in efficiently allocating the 
risk of interloper fraud. 
Systemic risk reduction efforts of funds transfer systems are generally 
neglected in the U.N. Model Law; these systems are ignored and the 
status of their rules is unclear. This contrasts with the treatment 
afforded by U.C.C. Article 4A. Article 4A, however, still needs 
improvement to adequately tailor the law to the needs of the relevant 
interest group. · 
This Article represents only the beginning of the scholarly research 
agenda on funds transfers. Because these statutes were so recently 
enacted there is little case law interpretation available. The common 
law, surely, will interpret and shape the statute. 211 Whether it does so 
with an understanding of the dynamic money movers and the non-stop 
global financial markets remains to be seen. 
211. See id. § 4A-102 cmt. 
